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ABSTRACT 
Enemies of the United States of America seek new asymmetric means to counter 
the strength of the American military. The rise in the use of cellular and smartphones 
around the globe has created new threats for military forces. This thesis shows cellular 
and smartphones are a medium for dissemination of propaganda and cyberspace 
exploitation, and thus are a focus for operational security concerns. The 2014 Russian 
invasion of Crimea and the subsequent occupation of Eastern Ukraine presents an 
excellent case study to examine the vulnerabilities of these devices. The war in Ukraine 
shows the use of text messages to spread propaganda, the manipulation of a Ukrainian 
fire support Android application to give away the location of its user to the enemy, and 
the dangers of OPSEC violations through social media posts to give away important 
military information. This thesis also examined the future threats to these vulnerable 
devices and their possible effects on the United States. The rise of 5G technology, 
deepfake videos, and vulnerabilities in the IoT all offer new vectors to attack and exploit 
American service members. Prescriptive measures the United States can employ through 
effective training and education are presented to ensure service members know the reason 
why their phones cannot be used. The thesis suggests this training needs to be applied to 
the allies and partner forces of the United States as well, to ensure their survival on the 
modern battlefield. 
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Adversaries of the United States have sought to use asymmetric means to disrupt 
American military efforts. The increasing popularity of cellular and smartphones in the 
general population has brought a new threat to this asymmetric environment. This thesis 
examines three particular risks from smartphones: propaganda, cyberspace exploitation, 
and operational security (OPSEC) concerns. The Russians, during their 2014 invasion of 
Ukraine, introduced “pinpoint propaganda” via targeted text messages to the personal cell 
phones of Ukrainian soldiers. These Russian techniques sought to degrade the morale of 
the Ukrainian Defense Force and cause desertion. Cyberspace exploitation will focus on 
the hacking of a Ukrainian Artillery Android Application that enabled the Russians to 
target Ukrainian artillery batteries. Careless posting on social media will illustrate OPSEC 
concerns by Russian troops. These OPSEC vulnerabilities will be highlighted in actions 
that ran counter to President Vladimir Putin’s denial of Russian forces in Ukrainian 
territory and in strong evidence procured by Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) collector 
Bellingcat that shows Russian forces downed Malaysian Airways Flight 17 over Ukraine. 
Mobile phones add new threats and vulnerabilities to a long list already faced by military 
commanders. This thesis seeks to explore the new vulnerabilities cellular phones introduce 
to the battlefield.  
A. METHODOLOGY
Man will always seek to use technology to further himself while also using it to
diminish the threat possessed by those around him. Often, innocent technologies can be 
used to create weapons or damaging effects in time of war. The crawler tractor was initially 
developed to assist in the preparation of fields for agriculture, but quickly became the 
critical component of the tank. Cellular phones and their networks were created to make 
communications easier; however, they can also be manipulated to create battlefield effects. 
To better understand the vulnerability of cellular phones in combat, one needs to examine 
a case study that details the key actions and effects of this capability. The 2014 Russian 
2 
invasion, and subsequent occupation, of eastern Ukraine is the best case study to explore 
this activity.  
This case study is pertinent because it is the only one that illustrates the 
vulnerabilities of cellular phones on a large scale. The United States has manipulated the 
phones of individuals fighters, but not nearly to the scale of the Russians. The Russian 
military and its proxies have targeted entire units and spoofed applications to take 
advantage of unsuspecting users. The Chinese are manipulating data and cellular networks 
through their 5G technology; however, at this time, these resources have not been utilized 
in any armed conflict. The Islamic State and Al Qaeda also manipulated cellular 
communications, but these actions were on a far smaller scale than the Russians, and often 
were only used to recruit new members and conjure support throughout the world. These 
entities did not use cellular communications to gain any advantage in combat.  
The use of a detailed case study will look at the conflict and allow a proper analysis 
of the various means and effects of cellular and smartphone manipulation in Ukraine. 
Furthermore, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is relevant because it shows what may 
happen to other countries on the border with Russia. The potential of this occurring to the 
United States military is significant since it is currently rotating Army Armored Brigade 
Combat Teams through Eastern Europe, in conjunction with the Infantry (Airborne) and 
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams stationed on the Continent, to train with partner forces. 
Working with these partner forces may place U.S. personnel in danger of mobile phone 
manipulation due to the proximity of Russian forces to training areas. It is also vital that 
U.S. personnel become fully aware of these vulnerabilities so they can better protect 
themselves and prepare partnered forces for Russian tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
Furthermore, some partner forces may not have the necessary encrypted 
communications equipment. Due to this shortcoming, the Ukrainian military relied heavily 
upon personal phones to send reports and issue tactical commands. While the United States 
military is fortunate to have encrypted communications devices down to the squad and 
even individual soldier level, not every nation or partnered force has this luxury. Leaders 
within the United States military need to be aware of threats to their forces and to partner 
forces that may also rely on cellular communications. 
3 
B. STRUCTURE 
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter II will give a technical background on 
the history and operation of cellular phones and networks. The chapter will also examine 
the operation and use of International Mobile Subscriber Identity Catchers. Chapter III is 
the Ukraine case study. This chapter will give a background to the Russian invasion and 
their development of the New Generation Warfare strategy. It will also cover each of the 
three vulnerabilities and how they were exploited during the conflict in Ukraine. Each 
vulnerability will conclude with an example affecting the United States military for added 
significance. Chapter IV will envision future threats enabled by mobile and smartphone 
use by the United States military using the vulnerabilities discussed in the previous chapter. 
After an examination of current and future threats, Chapter V will describe some 
prescriptive measures the United States military can adopt to mitigate these concerns. 
Mitigation measures will focus on the education and training of individual service 
members, U.S. military organizations, as well as allies and partner forces.  
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II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
A. HISTORY OF MOBILE PHONES 
A mobile phone is a communications device designed to be carried by a person and 
used while outside of a static environment. The idea of a mobile communications device is 
not new. What is commonly thought of today as a mobile phone was first developed during 
the Second World War. Soldiers utilized “handie talkies” to communicate between units at 
the company level and below.1 These devices, like the phones of today, had vulnerabilities 
that the Germans and Japanese exploited to gain tactical intelligence.2 After the war, 
technology was adapted to create mobile phones that could fit inside vehicles. These early 
devices were too large to be conveniently carried by a person, but could fit into vehicles 
with relative ease. In today’s vernacular, “mobile phone” and “cell phone” are used 
synonymously.3 However, the phrase “mobile phone” refers to a broad classification of 
devices that facilitate voice communications while moving. Cellular phones, which will be 
the subject of this chapter, use a networked infrastructure of antennae to send and receive 
messages.  
The first cellular phone, Motorola’s DynaTAC 800x, was invented in 1983. The 
phone was nearly a foot long, weighed 2 pounds, and had a battery life of about 30 
minutes.4 The first smartphone, IBM’s Simon, was created in 1993. Simon was a phone, 
notepad, calendar, address book, had a stylus, provided email service, and utilized 
predictive typing on its touch screen.5 Cellular phones were labeled “smart” when they 
gained the ability to connect to the internet. An examination of the history of the mobile 
 
1 Gil McElroy, “A Short History of the Handheld Transceiver,” QST (January 2005): 45–50, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060220092549/http://www2.arrl.org/qst/2005/01/0501047.pdf. 
2 Robert M. Clark, Intelligence Collection (Los Angeles, CA: SAGE, 2014), 96. 
3 Kelly, “Why Do We Use the Term Cellular Phone Instead of Mobile Phone?” Gizmodo, June 17, 
2013, gizmodo.com/why-do-we-use-the-term-cellular-phone-instead-of-mobile-5840939. 
4 Arun Kumar et al., “Mobile Phones: History and Growth,” EPRA International Jouranl of Research 
and Development 4, no. 3 (March 2019): 44–45, https://eprajournals.com/jpanel/upload/
837pm_11.Arun%20Kumar%20S-3013-1.pdf. 
5 Kumar et al., “Mobile Phones: History and Growth,” 46–47. 
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phone is interesting because it shows how far technology has developed in such a short 
period.  
In less than thirty years, the smartphone has evolved and developed into a tool that 
many people cannot live without. In 2020, nearly 3.5 billion people, or almost a third of 
the Earth’s population, own a smartphone.6  The number of people using the internet from 
mobile devices has surpassed the number of people using desktops in 2016.7 This trend is 
expected to continue. Most Americans no longer have landline phones. Cellular and 
smartphones have woven themselves into the fabric of everyday life. The same holds true 
within the military. Many service members are reliant on their phones for communications, 
research, entertainment, and relaxation. An understanding of cellular phones and their 
networks is essential to the study of the vulnerabilities introduced on the battlefield by 
these devices. The following description of cellular networks and components, the 
generations of mobile communication technology, and an introduction to International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) Catchers will assist in comprehending how phones are 
manipulated and the tools that execute these manipulations. 
B. CELLULAR NETWORK STRUCTURE 
Cellular networks are made up of small areas called cells. Within each of these cells 
is an antenna which is controlled by a base station that has its own unique group of radio 
channels. However, a tower located at least two cells away from another can reuse the same 
channels.8 The cells are hexagonal in shape to maximize the effective radius of each 
tower.9 These cells are situated in clusters of seven (see Figure 1). This allows each cluster 
to work seamlessly with other clusters of seven cells to create a cellular communications 
 
6 Deyan G., “60 Revealing Statistics about Smarthpone Usage in 2020,” Tech Jury, January 9, 2020, 
techjury.net/stats-about/smartphone-usage/#gref. 
7 Yoni Heisler, “Mobile Internet Usage Surpasses Desktop Usage for the First Time in History,” BGR, 
November 22, 2016, bgr.com/2016/11/02/internet-usage-desktop-vs-mobile/. 
8 Oliver C. Ibe, Fundamentals of Data Communication Networks (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2018), 256. 
9 Khaldoun Al Agha, Guy Pujolle, and Tara Ali‐Yahiya, Mobile and Wireless Networks, vol. 2 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2016), 19, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119007548. 
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network in a region.10 It should be noted that to provide effective coverage, each cell is not 
a perfect hexagon due to topography and different propagation conditions.11  
 
Figure 1. Illustration of Frequency Reuse in Two Adjacent Clusters12 
Cellular phone networks consist of four components: 1) mobile station, 2) base 
station, 3) base station controller, and 4) mobile switching center.13 The mobile station, or 
a mobile subscriber unit (MS), is the phone, tablet, or another device that is connected to 
the cellular network.14 The MS then has a transceiver that transmits and receives radio 
transmission to and from a base station.  
The base station (BS) is the tower within the center of a cell. Two different channels 
for traffic flow from the BS to the MS. The first is the control channel, which works to 
ensure the seamless transfer of information to maintain the connection through different 
 
10 Oliver C. Ibe, Fundamentals of Data Communication Networks (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2017), 257. 
11 Al Agha, Pujolle, and Ali‐Yahiya, Mobile and Wireless Networks, 19. 
12 Source: Ibe, Fundamentals of Data Communication Networks, 257. 
13 Ibe, 259. 
14 Ibe, 259. 
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cells. The second channel is used for the transport of voice, data, and other traffic.15 
Multiple base stations can be controlled by a Base Station Controller (BSC), which also 
acts as the interface for the BS and the Mobile Switching Center. 
An important component of voice communications is the Public Switched 
Telephone Network (PSTN). The PSTN is the traditional circuit switch telephone network 
that links all of the world’s telephone communication networks, made up of numerous 
switches that help to connect calls through landlines, microwave transmissions, cellular 
networks, communications satellites, and undersea telephone cables.16 The PSTN is what 
allows most telephones to communicate with one another. For example, a call made  
from a satellite phone can be answered by a landline phone and vice versa. While the PSTN 
used to be made up of copper wires, it is now almost entirely digital and utilizes fiber  
optic cable.  
The Mobile Switching Center (MSC) acts as the go-between from the cellular base 
station to the PSTN. In effect, the MSC acts as the interface with different networks within 
the PSTN (i.e., landline to cellular). However, the MSC is not just used in routing phone 
calls but also in conference calls, text messages, and faxes.17 The MSC is also a critical 
component in an inter-BSC handover. When “a mobile device is approaching the edge of 
its cell, a BSC requests handover assistance from its MSC. The MSC then scans a list of 
adjacent cells and their corresponding BSCs and facilitates the handover to the appropriate 
BSC.”18 Another important job for the MSC is the handover of an MS to a different BS. 
As a phone moves closer to being out of range from its current base station, “it is important 
for the MSC to determine each phone’s location to effectively facilitate routing 
communications between them.”19 To accomplish this, the MSC uses an extensive 
 
15 Al Agha, Pujolle, and Ali‐Yahiya, Mobile and Wireless Networks, 21. 
16 Cameron Johnson, “What Is PSTN and How Does it Actually Work?” Nextiva, April 4, 2019, 
www.nextiva.com/blog/what-is-pstn.html. 
17 “What Is a Mobile Switching Center (MSC)?” Techopedia, accessed May 3, 2020, 
www.techopedia.com/definition/8448/mobile-switching-center-msc. 
18 Techopedia.  
19 Techopedia. 
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“database known as the home location register (HLR), which stores relevant locations and 
other information for each mobile phone.”20 To prevent numerous search queries to the 
HLR, each MSC utilizes a Visitor Location Register (VLR) to cover the users currently 
roaming in the MSC location area. As will be described later, the data in these registers is 
an important source of information for IMSI Catchers, which use it to locate phones. This 
vulnerability is especially concerning to soldiers using phones on the battlefield. The entire 
cellular network and its components are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Architecture of Mobile Communication Networks21 
C. GENERATIONS OF MOBILE TECHNOLOGY 
Five successive generations of mobile communications technology have been 
created. Each new generation offers improvements to the older generation. These 
improvements vary from network design to increased data rate and additional security. As 
 
20 Techopedia. 
21 Source: Ibe, Fundamentals of Data Communication Networks, 260. 
 
10 
of 2020, the world is on the cusp of utilizing Fifth Generation Mobile technology. 
However, the majority of the United States is still using Fourth Generation Technology. 
The following describes the five current generations of mobile technology. 
1. First Generation Mobile Technology 
The first generation of mobile technology (1G) was completely analog and only 
capable of voice services.22 What differentiated 1G technology from earlier mobile 
communications networks, however, was its use of cellular technology. In the past, 
companies tried to make powerful base stations that could enable communication 
throughout its effective radius. The effective radius was about 50 miles and proved useful 
in metropolitan areas.23 But, once a user left that area, he/she could no longer 
communicate. This shortcoming necessitated the development of multiple small frequency 
base stations—a cellular structure—which were found to be more effective in creating a 
mobile communications network. While 1G technology had good voice quality, its spectral 
efficiency, or the rate of transported information on a specific frequency, was low. 
2. Second Generation Mobile Technology 
Second generation (2G) cellular networks were primarily voice and secondary data 
networks. As opposed to the 1G network, the speed of these networks was also faster. The 
1G PSTN data rate was 2.4kbps, while the 2G network’s data rate 64 kbps.24 The increased 
spectral efficiency, speed, is due to the abandonment of 1G analog technology and the shift 
to digital technology utilized in 2G. Two of the most used networks utilizing 2G technology 
were the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA). These two different network types were used by different providers and 
utilized MS that were incompatible with the other network (i.e., a GSM phone could not 
be used in a CDMA covered area). One of the most significant weaknesses of this 
technology is the lack of authentication between the BS and MS. A MS, or phone, must 
 
22 Al Agha, Pujolle, and Ali‐Yahiya, Mobile and Wireless Networks, 2. 
23 Ibe, Fundamentals of Data Communication Networks, 262. 
24 Ibe, 262–63. 
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identify itself to the BS, or tower, but not vice versa.25 The lack of authentication opens 
2G technology to the threat of BS spoofing.  
3. Third Generation Mobile Technology 
Networks that comply with the specifications outlined in the International Mobile 
Telecommunications 2000 agreement by the International Telecommunications Union are 
considered third generation (3G) mobile networks.26 3G provided transmission speeds of 
2MB/s for stationary or walking users and 348KB/s for moving vehicles.27 This 
technology allowed advanced capabilities such as “Global Positioning System (GPS), 
location-based services, video on demand, and video conferencing.”28 3G Technology also 
allowed MS to authenticate the network they are connecting to as a means to prevent cell 
tower spoofing. 
4. Fourth Generation Mobile Technology 
Fourth Generation Mobile Technology is completely Internet Protocol (IP) 
driven.29 The speeds of 4G are significantly faster and allow the user to enjoy better voice 
quality, faster downloads, higher streaming speeds, and less buffering. Data rates for 4G in 
moving vehicles are 100MB/s and 1GB/s when stationary.30  
5. Fifth Generation Mobile Technology 
The latest generation of mobile communications networks is still in development 
at the time of writing. However, this technology is expected to move data faster and allow 
significantly more devices to connect to the network. 5G is designed to meet the challenges 
 
25 Joseph Ooi, “IMSI Catchers and Mobile Security” (capstone thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 
2015), 8, https://www.cis.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/EAS499Honors-
IMSICatchersandMobileSecurity-V18F.pdf. 
26 Ooi, “IMSI Catchers and Mobile Security,” 9. 
27 Ooi, 9. 
28 Ooi, 9. 
29 “Generations of Mobile Networks: Explained,” Just Ask Gemalto, August 2, 2018, 
www.justaskgemalto.com/us/ generations -mobile-networks-explained/.  
30 Ooi, “IMSI Catchers and Mobile Security,” 9. 
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of the Internet of Things (IoT).31 As more and more appliances and devices connect to the 
IoT, a new, more extensive, faster, and more flexible network is needed to ensure 
satisfactory performance for the end-user.  
D. INTERNATIONAL MOBILE SUBSCRIBER IDENTITY CATCHERS 
Creating devices to deceive an adversary are as old as war itself. The best example 
of this is the Trojan Horse. During the war against the Trojans, the Greeks built a giant 
wooden horse disguised to look like a gift to the Trojans, but in actuality, it was full of 
soldiers. When the Trojans brought the gift into the gates of Troy, the deception was 
revealed, and Greek soldiers poured out of the horse and gained entry to the fortress city 
of Troy with relative ease. An International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) Catcher acts 
in a similar vein, in terms of its deceptive capability.  
In short, an IMSI Catcher acts as a fake base station or cellular tower. “IMSI 
catchers use a ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack, simultaneously posing as the fake mobile phone 
to the real base station and as the fake base station to the real mobile phone.”32 This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. Like the “Greeks bearing gifts,” it deceives phones by making it 
believe the IMSI catcher is a base station with the strongest signal in the area. This 
capability allows the phone to disconnect from a legitimate tower and reconnect 
automatically with the IMSI catcher or fake base station. As discussed earlier, 2G 
technology does not need the tower or BS to authenticate itself to the phone, MS. Only the 
phone has to authenticate itself to the tower. This is rectified in 3G when both the tower 
and the phone have to authenticate with one another. Currently, all phones are backward 
compatible with older-generation infrastructure.33 Thus, a 4G phone can work on a 2G 
network to ensure seamless service for the user. Unfortunately, most IMSI catchers work 
on the 2G network. The phones, regardless of generation, having been deceived go into the 
2G mode, no longer expect authentication from the tower, and connect to the IMSI catcher. 
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The IMSI is a unique number stored in the Subscriber Identity Module, or SIM card, inside 
each cellular phone, or MS.34 This number “is used to acquire the details of the mobile 
[device] in the […] HLR or the […] VLR.”35 With this information, the IMSI Catcher can 
locate phones as well as identify the traffic in its vicinity and then target that traffic for 
interception and analysis.36 These devices can target anyone in a variety of settings, to 
include soldiers on the battlefield. 
IMSI Catchers have the ability to manipulate cell phones and gather significant 
amounts of information from them. While the basic catcher can be used to locate a phone’s 
user, more advanced models and upgrades can be used to eavesdrop on the user’s calls, 
record calls, intercept and redirect SMS, and, most strikingly, retrieve files from the phone. 
For example, the most well-known commercially developed IMSI Catcher, the Stingray, 
can be upgraded by the Harris Corporation with a “FishHawk” system to eavesdrop on 
calls and the “Porpoise” system to read text messages.37 These add-ons make IMSI 
catchers very effective intelligence gathering tools for government, military, and criminal 
elements. 
Another unique ability of the IMSI catcher is its ability to send mass text messages. 
Using the same process of deception described earlier, the catcher acts as a cellular tower 
and attracts phones to connect with it. Once the phones have authenticated themselves to 
the catcher, it “sends an SMS message to the user device using a spoofed phone number. 
This action can be repeated multiple times.”38 The spoofed phone number can be from a 
legitimate business or any other number to make the sent message seem more trustworthy. 
In China, these illegal devices are not used only for advertising; some nefarious groups use 
the mass texting ability of fake base stations in phishing attacks to get the personal 
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information of their victims.39 After sending the message, the catcher needs to cut off from 
the phone to prevent the user from realizing it has been connected to a fake base station. 
The catcher ends the connection by lowering its signal strength, changing its base station 
ID, or ending the signal.40 This allows the user’s device to reconnect to a legitimate base 
station. 
 
Figure 3. Diagram of IMSI Catcher Use41 
E. HISTORY OF IMSI CATCHER USE 
The first IMSI Catcher was created as early as 1993.42 These early pieces of 
technology were large and, at the time, very cost-prohibitive. However, in 2010, Chris 
Paget presented a homemade IMSI catcher he built for about $1,500 at the hacker 
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41 “IMSI Catcher Detector: Stingray Surveillance Detection Services: USA,” COMSEC, December 21, 
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15 
exposition, DEFCON.43 The devices were initially marketed to Law Enforcement entities 
to track the location of suspects through the use of their cellular phones.44 The United 
States Marshals, who are known for high-risk fugitive apprehension, pioneered the use of 
IMSI Catchers to assist in the location and arrest of criminals.45 The Marshal Service 
operated several Cessna light aircraft with powerful IMSI Catchers. The combination of 
rapid movement from the aircraft, and the powerful scanner of the IMSI catcher, meant the 
Marshals Service could search a large metropolitan area for certain cell phones that were 
known to be used by the criminals they were targeting. The unfortunate consequence was 
that thousands of other innocent Americans were having their cell phones intercepted by 
the law enforcement agency. Within the United States, there is some debate on the legality 
of law enforcement entities to use IMSI catchers in regard to the illegal search of innocent 
citizens’ phones.46 
Militaries also utilize IMSI Catchers. The United States military employed IMSI 
catchers to locate terrorists in both Iraq and Afghanistan.47 The Israelis may have also used 
these devices to send messages to residents in Gaza. To prevent civilian casualties and 
collateral damage, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) sends texts, phone calls, and leaflets to 
warn civilians about upcoming strikes and the danger of being close to Hamas weapons 
and facilities. An official Israeli Defense Force website, aimed at illustrating the ways 
Israel prevents collateral damage in Gaza, states, “As part of its efforts to minimize civilian 
casualties in Gaza, the IDF makes phone calls and sends text messages to civilians residing 
in buildings designated for an attack.”48 Presumably, the IDF utilized an IMSI catcher to 
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disseminate text messages to the greatest number of people in their targeted area. 
Conversely, Hamas has also sent text messages to the Israeli population. In response to an 
Israeli offensive into Gaza in late 2008, Hamas sent a message threatening rocket attack 
reprisals into cities in Israel.49 The IDF and Hamas text battle is unique as it shows cell 
phone use against state and non-state actors. The War in Ukraine shows the more 
widespread use of IMSI Catchers and their ability to send mass text messages to cellular 
phones. 
Much like the Israelis, Hamas, and Chinese criminals, the Russians have used IMSI 
catchers to send text messages to cellular phones as a means to spread propaganda. Going 
a step further, the Russians have employed drones to propagate their text message 
campaign by impersonating cell phone towers. This electronic warfare system is called 
LEER 3 and consists of three unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and a mobile command 
center (see Figure 4). The UAVs’ “primary mission is to suppress cellular communication 
towers. […] Having jammed the base stations, the old Orlan-10 UAVs were able to send 
instant messages to subscribers under certain conditions […] They ‘jam’ base stations and 
take their place, while becoming virtual cellular stations.”50  While not explicitly stating 
it, the Russians have produced flying IMSI catchers to jam enemy communications and 
send messages. These devices, like the IMSI catchers described earlier, can also be used to 
locate cell phone users. LEER 3 systems can also drop disposable jammers on the 
ground.51 In Syria, Russia used the LEER 3 to alert Syrian civilians of humanitarian 
assistance centers and evacuation routes, despite the cellular network of the region being 
destroyed. By controlling the cellular architecture, the Russians have gained a significant 
advantage in controlling the information environment and influencing Ukrainian soldiers 
with ease. 
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Figure 4. Leer 3 System with Command and Control Truck and 
Orlan-10 UAV52 
Multiple vectors exist to compromise the user of a cellular phone. The infrastructure 
of the network, applications downloaded to phones, and the hardware installed in phones 
can all create vulnerabilities. This thesis will focus on the vulnerability of phones as 
vehicles for propaganda, targets of cyberspace exploitation, and OPSEC violations due to 
misuse by the user. The battlefield of Ukraine will exhibit these vulnerabilities clearly and 
show the direct battlefield effects these devices have had upon the combatants. The 
vulnerability of cellular phones shows the lack of understanding by the user as well as the 
lack of security in the network and the devices themselves. 
 
52 Source: “Russian Leer-3 EW System Revealed in Donbas,” Inform Napalm, September 25, 2016, 
informnapalm.org/en/russian-leer-3wf-donbas/. 
18 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
19 
III. UKRAINIAN CASE STUDY 
Ivan, a soldier in the Ukrainian 10th Mountain Assault Brigade, had been in the 
same battle position for well over a month. He had deployed to Eastern Ukraine for “Anti-
Terrorism Operations” after the Russian invasion of Donbass. He had become accustomed 
to the daily mortar barrage at about 10 AM, and had gotten used to the rainy and cloudy 
days and chilly nights. His commander had finally acquired a night vision device to make 
sentry duty at night easier, but its novelty soon wore off. Recently, the Russian backed 
separatists seemed to have calmed down. Despite the mortar barrage in the late morning, 
there were no other attacks. Previously, the two sides conducted dismounted patrols within 
the area between the lines which often resulted in sporadic gunfights and occasional 
artillery strikes. 
Just as Ivan was slipping into a daydream about his family back home, he felt his 
phone vibrate. “Speak of the devil,” he thought, as he grabbed the phone from the shoulder 
pocket on his camouflage parka. He took it out of the plastic sandwich bag that protected 
it from the rain. The phone had a cracked screen, but he could still watch movies and 
navigate his apps. Ivan had received a text message, but it was not from whom he had 
hoped. “You have been charged 1000 hryvnia for supporting the Anti-Terrorism 
Operations,” the text stated. He sighed. It was another message from the Russians. A couple 
of days ago he had received a more-sinister message telling him, “The same winter that 
ended the Nazis is coming for you.” Most of the time, Ivan and his squad laughed about 
these messages. However, as the days went on and the time away from home compounded, 
Ivan started to have doubts about why he was at the front and what was happening with his 
family. The messages, in conjunction with low pay, mediocre food, and spartan living 
conditions, were beginning to affect him and the morale of his unit.  
The scenario depicted above is realistic for members of the Ukrainian Army. The 
New Generation Warfare strategy employed by the Russians and their allied forces has 
emphasized operations in the information environment. Resulting in their ability to use 
weaknesses within cellular phones to target, disrupt, and destroy the Ukrainian forces that 
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oppose them. The cellular phone—a device that is so important to humans in the civilian 
world—can become their undoing in the tactical arena.  
This chapter aims to illustrate, through the context of the 2014 Russian invasion 
and subsequent occupation of Ukraine, the vulnerabilities of cellular and smartphone use 
on the battlefield. The vulnerabilities that are created by using cellular phones on the 
battlefield include: phones being used as vehicles for propaganda by the enemy, as targets 
of cyberspace exploitation by the enemy, and as an OPSEC concern that the enemy can use 
as a source of intelligence. A background to the conflict will assist the reader in 
understanding the combatants and their reasons for fighting. Next, an overview of Russian 
New Generation Warfare (NGW) and its use of Information Warfare (IW) will be 
examined to show how the Russians view the information environment and look for ways 
to exploit it. Then, each vulnerability will be discussed, and an example from Ukraine will 
be utilized to illustrate how the phone was used to cause effects on the battlefield. Finally, 
an example of each cell phone vulnerability involving the United States will also be 
described to emphasize the susceptibility within the United States military. The conflict in 
Ukraine provides an interesting case study that reveals cell phone vulnerabilities on the 
battlefield. Furthermore, it illustrates some of the capabilities the Russians can bring to 
bear in conflict with other nations or irregular forces.  
A. HISTORY OF CONFLICT 
From Turks to Tartars to Cossacks to Little Green Men, Ukraine has been a 
contentious region with a conflicted past. The main source of this disagreement is attributed 
to the Crimean Peninsula located south of Ukraine. Crimea holds a strategic position in the 
Black Sea as ports in this area can utilize the Bosporus sea lane through Istanbul to gain 
access to the Mediterranean and, eventually, the oceans of the world. For centuries, people 
have found Crimea to be an important piece of territory and worthy of fighting over for 
control. 
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After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1920, Ukraine was given its independence, but 
Crimea remained a part of Russia.53 After the Second World War, many of the minorities, 
including Ukrainians, were deported from Crimea due to accusations of collaborating with 
the Nazis. In 1954 Crimea was given to Ukraine by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to 
simplify economic, political, and administrative concerns.54 This move was not popular 
within the populations of Crimea or Russia. The fall of the Soviet Union exacerbated these 
perceptions and caused more conflict.  
Crimea sought to become an independent state from Ukraine. In 1992, Crimea 
created its own constitution and declared itself the “sovereign state of the Republic of 
Crimea,” despite having its independence referendum canceled.55 The region remained in 
limbo. In 1995 the Ukrainian Parliament abolished Crimea’s 1992 Constitution.56 Kyiv 
accepted a final, much weaker Crimean Constitution in 1998. The new constitution gave 
Crimea few rights and allowed them to make only small local law changes. The Ukrainian 
government attempted to force a linguistic and cultural “Ukrainification” program among 
the Crimean people.57 The unsuccessful program only provoked a greater hope of 
independence on Crimea’s part and a deepening resentment of Ukraine.  
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians have viewed the expansion of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a threat. Many wondered if NATO would 
continue to exist as an alliance after its sole threat was defeated with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The opposite occurred, and NATO expanded. Former Soviet satellite states 
joined NATO as a sign of support for Western Europe. NATO was established in 1949 
with twelve original members, four more joined before the collapse of the Soviet Union.58 
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Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has grown to include thirteen more countries, all of 
which were former Soviet satellites.  
Russia, therefore, has sought to end NATO enlargement. It has protested every 
country’s adoption into NATO since the end of the Cold War. “In April 2008, NATO 
promised membership to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest summit, but a membership 
plan was not offered.”59 Several months later, in August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia 
under “the pretext of defending the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.”60 
These regions later declared their independence from Georgia; however, “Russia is one of 
the few countries in the world to recognize this [pronouncement].”61  
There was also a Russian response to Ukrainian efforts to join NATO and the 
European Union. Russians pressured the Ukrainian leadership to remain at their side 
instead of joining the west. “The demonstrations which began in Kyiv, known as the 
Maidan Protests, in November 2013 were born out of Ukrainians’ desire for a closer 
relationship with the European Union, and their frustration when former President 
Yanukovych halted progress toward that goal as a result of Russian pressure.”62 
Yanukovych was from the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine, which is heavily influenced 
by Russia. He aimed to strengthen relations with Russia, which instigated a growing series 
of civil demonstrations throughout Ukraine, the Maidan Protests.63  The protestors’ 
demands included a government of national unity, an end of government corruption, early 
presidential elections, and an end to violent government actions against demonstrators.64 
These protests ended with the removal of Yanukovych on 22 February 2014.65 The 
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Russians saw this as a threat to their influence in the region and an opportunity to secure 
access to the Black Sea by invading Crimea. The continued unrest in Ukraine sparked 
another opportunity for Russia to invade eastern Ukraine. This action, like a similar 
incursion into Georgia eight years before, destabilized the borders of those countries; 
border conflict is a disqualifier for NATO acceptance.66 While both countries aspire to 
become NATO members, they cannot due to their border disputes with Russia. 
The valuable naval assets of the Black Sea Fleet proved to be another point of 
contention for Ukraine and Russia. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Russia and 
Ukraine claimed possession of the fleet and its military assets.67 Russia eventually was 
allowed to claim 81.7% of the vessels, continue to keep of force 25,000 service personnel 
stationed in Crimea, and the stipulation that any military equipment introduced or removed 
needed the approval of Ukraine. This agreement was to last twenty years and would have 
been up for review in 2017.  
Russia’s goal is to maintain an “uncontested and exclusive sphere of influence in 
the territory that once formed the Soviet Union.”68 To accomplish this aim, the Russians 
leverage the weaknesses in their adversaries and counter strengths at a level below the 
threshold of war in order to achieve their aspirations.69One of the most effective tools is 
to utilize information warfare. 
B. RUSSIA AND INFORMATION WARFARE 
The Invasion of Ukraine has provided a unique laboratory for Russia to experiment 
and test many of its new capabilities, stratagems, and techniques. The success of this 
operation should not surprise a student of modern Russian military history. Instead, it 
shows a natural progression from operations in Chechnya and Georgia. The current Russian 
strategy is known by many names: The Gerasimov Doctrine, Hybrid Warfare, Non-linear 
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Warfare, or as the Russians themselves call it, New Generation Warfare.70 The Russians 
no longer see a difference between war and peace. Everything to them is a state of conflict. 
Because of this broad view, NGW encompasses all the elements of state power and 
incorporates military might with non-military means. According to Molly K. Mckew, 
Russia’s NGW is “waged on all fronts with a range of actors and tools—for example, 
hackers, media, businessmen, leaks and, yes, fake news, as well as conventional and 
asymmetric military means. Thanks to the internet and social media, […] upending the 
domestic affairs of nations with information alone—are now plausible.”71 The man 
credited with creating this strategy of Russian warfare is General Valery Gerasimov, who 
authored, “The Value of Science in Prediction” in February 2013.72 He is Russia’s chief 
of the General Staff, which is comparable to the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.73 The Russian military views this new strategy as a direct counter to the type of 
threat they perceive from the West and have taken significant steps to ensure its military is 
prepared to fight and prevail in this type of conflict.  
The Russian use of IW is perhaps their most effective weapon. Mark Galeotti 
believes, “The Russian view of modern war is based on the idea that the main battlescape 
is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and 
psychological warfare.”74 The Russians understand the importance of the information 
environment and information dominance. IW can have a far greater effect on the enemy 
than traditional kinetic operations. 
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The Russians have proven to be very capable and confident in their ability to exploit 
and manipulate the information environment. Understanding the manipulation of the 
information environment is not a standalone operation; the Russians incorporate this 
strategy into all operations, including combined arms maneuver. The synchronization of 
Electronic Warfare, Information Operations, Cyber Operations, Psychological Operations, 
and kinetic actions into one combined threat is a hallmark of the Russian military. Many 
Russian senior military leaders believe “information is ‘not just an addition to firepower, 
attack, manoeuvre, but transforms and unites all of these.’”75 The actions of Russia during 
the Ukrainian Campaign illustrate this capability well through the exploitation of cellular 
and smartphone use on the battlefield. 
C. MEDIUM OF PROPAGANDA 
The use of “pinpoint propaganda” represents perhaps one of the most sinister tactics 
to emerge from the war in Ukraine.76 This is an influence operation where a soldier is sent 
a message directly from the enemy. The most common method for sending this information 
is by text message on the soldier’s mobile phone. Since the conflict began, Ukrainian 
soldiers have been receiving targeted text messages from pro-Russia Militias or the Russian 
military (see Figure 5). These messages include: “UAFers [Ukrainian Armed Forces], 
you’re just [nothing but] meat for your commanders; UAF [Ukrainian Armed Forces] 
soldier! You’ll be found [they’ll find your body] when the snow melts, ATO [Anti-Terrorism 
Operation] fighter; This Winter is [looking like the one that hit] the Germans near 
Stalingrad.”77 Messages like this have the potential to decrease morale within the 
Ukrainian Military. More insidious accounts include text messages sent to the families of 
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Ukrainian soldiers, urging them to give up and go home.78 Most soldiers expect the 
hardships of the battlefield and are trained to be resilient in these conditions. Family 
members are less prepared for the effects of the battlefield. For family members to receive 
direct propaganda attacks must have had a tremendous impact on the morale of soldiers 
and decreased the motivation of the civilian population as well. 
The use of propaganda, psychological operations, and Military Information Support 
Operations (MISO) has occurred for centuries, and the conflict in Ukraine is no different. 
Russian leadership “invests significant resources in both foreign and domestic propaganda 
and places a premium on transmitting […] consistent, self-reinforcing narratives regarding 
its desires and redlines, whether on Ukraine, Syria, or with the United States.”79 What 
makes this action unique is the use of phones as a medium for enemy propaganda. At the 
tactical level, psychological warfare aimed at causing fear or at building a divide between 
the soldier and the government or home front is called counterforce.80 In the past, leaflets 
and loudspeakers infected groups with propaganda; there have been few cases where an 
individual becomes the target. In 1995 Martin Libicki predicted a “great shift in 
counterforce psychological operations would come when information technology permits 
broadcast of threats or resentment-provoking information to individual opposing troops.”81 
The necessary technology is now here. Text messages allow the user to tailor the message 
to an individual unit or even a particular soldier.82 
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Television reporter Julia Kirienko holding her phone with a text message she 
received while reporting from the conflict area. The text reads, “Ukrainian 
Soldier, They’ll find your body when the snow melts.” 
Figure 5. Russian Text Message83 
A collection of these text messages has been gathered by Raphael Satter, a reporter 
for Reuters News Agency.84 The collection includes forty-two instances of propaganda 
text messages. Satter’s dataset consists of the date, time, location, sent phone number, the 
original text in Cyrillic, and a translated version of the message in English. Unfortunately, 
this dataset is not complete, and some information such as the date, time, and location was 
missing for of some of the included text messages. This data combined with the location 
of attacks in eastern Ukraine, can give a better picture of who and where the Russians were 
targeting Ukrainians with their text message propaganda campaign.  
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dataset on Ukraine shows where a 
majority of the kinetic activity in Ukraine occurred. The UCDP “is the world’s main 
provider of data on organized violence […]. Its definition of armed conflict has become 
the global standard of how conflicts are systematically defined and studied. UCDP 
 
83 Source: “Sinister Text Messages Reveal High-Tech Front in Ukraine War,” Voice of America, May 
11, 2017, www.voanews.com/europe/sinister-text-messages-reveal-high-tech-front-ukraine-war.  
84 Raphael Satter, “‘You’re Just Meat’—Ukrainian Soldiers Get Chilling Texts,” Associated Press, 
May 11, 2017, apnews.com/1096d53b7e5a4a9682d6b434021fb2f8.  
28 
produces high-quality data, which are systematically collected, have global coverage, are 
comparable across cases and countries, and have long time series which are updated 
annually.”85 The attached graphics were created using the tools located in the free and 
open-source Quantum Geographic Information System (QGIS) visualization software. 
Figure 6 depicts the country of Ukraine and, in purple, the significant activities (SIGACTs) 
that have taken place in the country from 2014 to 2018. One can see from the map that a 
majority of the action has taken place in an area of eastern Ukraine called Donbass. This 
area consists of the provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk that border Russia.  
 
Figure 6. Map of Ukraine Showing the Location of SIGACTs from 
2014 to 201886 
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While there were also SIGACTs in Kyiv, Odessa, and Crimea depicted on the 
graphic, this thesis assumes that they are not salient to this analysis since they did not occur 
during times of combat. These data points represent protests, which are also a part of the 
UCPD dataset. The author believes the data point in Kyiv was in reference to the protests 
in February of 2014 that resulted in the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych and the 
overthrow of the Ukrainian Government. There were similar protests in Odessa from 
January to May of 2014. The Crimea event is from the Russian annexation of territory in 
late February and early March of 2014. The majority of activity in the east stems from the 
Russian invasion. Russian supported separatists and Russian forces fighting against the 
Ukrainian Army and some militia forces are responsible for the remainder of the activity. 
Figure 7 shows a close up of the Donbass conflict region, its SIGACTs, and the 
location of text messages received by Ukrainians based on Satter’s dataset. The most 
significant aspect of this information is how the text message locations line up directly with 
the thickest belt of SIGACTs in Eastern Ukraine. The Russians have become quite 
proficient at combining the functions of information, movement and maneuver, and fires 
to make military operations more successful. Control of the information environment has 
made Russian military action more effective. One of the techniques used by the Russians 
to gain this control of the information environment is to manipulate the inherent 
vulnerabilities of cellular phones. 
The use of text messages through cell phones is unique to the 21st century. Never 
before have soldiers had the ability to receive messages from around the world at a 
moment’s notice. While receiving updates from home is uplifting, receiving messages from 




Figure 7. Map of Conflict Provinces with SIGACTs and Text Message 
Locations87 
The Russians have taken traditional propaganda and modernized it to influence 
individuals or many individuals to have a profound impact on the battlefield. Figure 8 
breaks down the topic of the propaganda text messages sent during the war in Ukraine. The 
topics consisted of the threat of imminent death, financial concerns, family heartstrings, 
becoming a puppet of the government, becoming a puppet of the military, false stories, 
civilian detriment, and retreat/surrender/go home. Of these messages, the most common 
dealt with imminent death and financial matters. The Russians were intentional when 
choosing who and what to target. The average Ukrainian soldier at the time was paid  
very little, under-equipped, and forced to live in austere conditions while deployed  
on “Antiterrorism Operations.” Since one of the key effects of propaganda is to erode 
morale and cause desertions, these topics are especially successful for targeting a  
Ukrainian soldier. 
 
87 Adapted from UCDP, “Ukraine”; Satter, “You’re Just Meat.” 
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Figure 8. Propaganda Topics88 
Of note, regular government troops from Ukraine were very susceptible to the 
effects of these targeted text messages, while members of the volunteer battalions were 
not; it only made them more upset and motivated them to attack Russian units.89 The poor 
conditions facing government troops explains how inclined they were to be affected by the 
messaging. The years of corruption by government officials and contractors took a heavy 
toll on the Ukrainian military before the invasion even began.90 The poor response of the 
military to the pro-Russian separatists showed the effects of low pay, poor training, and 
obsolete equipment. However, some volunteer forces were better-equipped thanks to the 
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funding provided by wealthy oligarchs.91 In many cases, the best members of the 
Ukrainian military joined the volunteer units for better pay and equipment. This made the 
volunteer units more effective and impaired the training of government units. These 
circumstances made the Ukrainian government troops more vulnerable to the directed 
propaganda from the Russians. 
It is possible that significantly more messages were sent during this conflict. This 
is especially true when one considers the LEER-3 system “has a cell site simulator built 
into a drone that is capable of acting over a 6-kilometer-wide area and hijacking up to 2,000 
cell phone connections at once.”92 Effectively, the LEER-3 system acts as a flying IMSI 
catcher, which gives the device a significantly larger range than a traditional ground-based 
system. With this coverage area, the LEER-3 may have affected many more people with 
Russian propaganda messages. 
Figure 9 shows the number of text messages sent per year by location of where they 
were received. The cities of Avidiivka (2017), Schastia (2015), and Svitlodarsk (2016) all 
match up to battles that took place at these locations at the same time.93 This coincides 
with the NGW Strategy of the Russians using text messages as a part of their IW capability 
to improve kinetic operations on the ground. While Debaltseve was not a battle site in 2015, 
it was a Ukrainian held position close to the front lines with Russian Separatists. Therefore, 
it was most likely the target of Russian IW and Psychological Operations as they attempted 
to influence the population and the Ukrainian security forces to withdraw. 
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Figure 9. Texts per Year by Location94 
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the Russian ability to use messages from 
trusted communication sources, such as text (SMS), social media messaging, or email to 
target individuals on a mass scale. The consequence is the target is more likely to believe 
the message because it is from a trusted medium.95 While the conflict in Ukraine has shown 
text messages to be effective tools for propaganda, they can also be used for more lethal 
means. The most extreme form of this phenomenon is described by Army Colonel Liam 
Collins, the Director of the Modern War Institute at West Point. He states: 
In one tactic, soldiers receive texts telling them they are “surrounded and 
abandoned.” Minutes later, their families receive a text stating, “Your son 
is killed in action,” which often prompts a call or text to the soldiers. 
Minutes later, soldiers receive another message telling them to “retreat and 
live,” followed by an artillery strike to the location where a large group of 
cellphones was detected. Thus, in one coordinated action, electronic warfare 
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is combined with cyberwarfare, information operations, and artillery strikes 
to produce psychological and kinetic effects.96 
This example tragically illustrates the ability of the Russians to integrate fires and 
information warfare to achieve not just psychological effects but lethal effects as well. The 
vulnerability of cellular and smartphones is not limited to propaganda. Cellular and 
smartphones have deadly consequences that can affect units on the battlefield. 
D. AMERICAN EXAMPLE: FAKE DRAFT TEXT MESSAGE 
Propaganda via cellular phone text message is not unique to Ukraine or the 
Russians. Americans have been hit by similar messages. Most recently, after the Iranian 
crisis in January of 2020, some American citizens reported receiving text messages on their 
phones about a mandatory military draft.97 While the perpetrator of these messages is still 
unknown, as the case is currently under investigation, it does bring several interesting 
aspects to light. 
The sender of these false military draft text messages smartly targeted a vulnerable 
American public. The timing was also effective as the messages were sent soon after the 
United States conducted an airstrike that killed Iranian Quds Force Commander, General 
Qasem Soleimani. This action increased the tensions between the two countries and caused 
speculations of war within various media camps. As a result, the American public was 
primed and more susceptible to believe and be concerned by a message about the military 
drafting civilians. Furthermore, the message used specific locations (cities and states) as 
well as the names of actual and fictional U.S. Army Recruiting Commanders to make them 
more believable.98 The day after the airstrike took place, Google noted a surge in searches 
for “conscription,” “Selective Service,” and “Iran.” The United States Selective Service 
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website also crashed as a massive influx of people went to the site looking for information. 
These text messages seek to weaken the trust citizens have in their government. They also 
build fear and paranoia within the citizenry. These feelings, when mixed with the right 
message, can bring internal unrest and fearmongering. The fake draft text messages show 
the vulnerability of people to the effects of phones being used as a vehicle of propaganda. 
It also illustrates that text message-based propaganda is not just limited to combatants or 
the battlefield; civilians and family members can also become targets. 
E. TARGETS OF CYBERSPACE EXPLOITATION 
Not only can the public be seen as a vulnerable target, phones themselves can be 
the target of attacks on the battlefield, making the information environment as dangerous 
as any literal place on the battlefield. One of the key components of the information 
environment is the internet. Through the internet, one can share information and 
communications with millions of other users to spread ideas and information. It also has 
the potential to spread malware and other dangerous weapons that can take advantage of 
and harm users. Within the United States Department of Defense, cyberspace exploitations 
are “actions taken in cyberspace to gain intelligence, maneuver, collect information, or 
perform other enabling actions required to prepare for future military operations.”99 While 
many may consider the targets of cyberspace exploitation limited to computer systems, this 
section will demonstrate the vulnerability of cellular and smartphones to these actions.  
Smartphones, which are very susceptible to malware and hacking, are within the 
purview of cyberspace exploitation. One reason for vulnerability is that “patches are not 
up-to-date because mobile devices are not scheduled for updates as frequently as desktop 
computers.”100 This allows nefarious actors to create exploits and malware that can easily 
infect and disrupt devices. Initially, Android devices were the only type targeted with 
malware. However, Apple iOS attacks are also becoming more common.101  In Ukraine, 
 
99 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyberspace Operations, JP 3-12 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff), GL-
4. 
100 Nick Ismail, “Common Security Vulnerabilities of Mobile Devices,” Information Age, February 
21, 2017, www.information-age.com/security-vulnerabilities-mobile-devices-123464616/. 
101 Ismail, “Common Security Vulnerabilities of Mobile Devices.” 
36 
Android is the most popular phone type and was targeted by the Russians for the majority 
of their exploitations.102 An excellent example of this is the hacking of a Ukrainian Fire 
Support Android Application. 
The Ukrainian Army, at the time of the invasion, did not have enough fire control 
computers or encrypted communications equipment to allow for accurate and timely 
artillery fires. As a result, an officer of the 55th Artillery Brigade, Yaroslav Sherstuk, 
developed an Android operating system application to speed up the fire mission processing 
time for the D30 122mm towed howitzer.103 The Russians were able to hack into this 
application and exploit it to gather the locations of the application’s users and, as a result, 
the artillery unit itself. While the geolocation software on the phone was not enough to 
warrant an accurate target location, it was enough of an electronic signature to send other 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to search the area. This often 
meant the Russians sent UAVs with sensors to better locate and target Ukrainian units. 
Once the target was found, the UAV would send the necessary location data to a Russian 
artillery system to strike Ukrainian emplacements and neutralize them. It is estimated that 
the Ukrainians lost 15% to 20% of all their D-30 artillery systems through the course of 
the war in the east.104 
The Android application created by Sherstuk worked by streamlining and 
automating the requirements for artillery missions. Artillery needs five elements for 
accurate fire: accurate target location, location of the weapon to be employed, weapon data 
and ammunition characteristics, meteorological information, and finally, correct 
computations.105 Sherstuk’s artillery application made processing fire missions easy for 
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artillery units. The user merely input the weather and target location. The application 
utilized the cellular phone’s internal GPS to locate itself on the battlefield and, since it was 
designed for only the D30 howitzer, it had the necessary weapon and ammunition data 
already programmed within its coding. With this information, the application would 
automatically compute a firing solution which significantly decreased the time it took for 
artillery to receive, process, and then fire a mission. Where it used to take a firing element 
minutes to process a mission, Sherstuk’s application computed a fire mission in under 
fifteen seconds.106  
Eventually, Sherstuk’s useful application found itself within the crosshairs of the 
Russians. Sherstuk never placed his application in the Android Market.107 As a tactical 
tool, this is understandable as he did not want outside agents to get a hold of it or utilize its 
coding. This was also part of the application’s undoing. Sherstuk advertised his application 
on a Ukrainian Military page which was posted to a Russian social media platform similar 
to Facebook, called VKontakte. He then attempted to control the dispersal of the 
application from his own website, as well as secure the application by issuing an activation 
code to screen users. By not placing the application on an authorized storefront, there was 
no way to control access to the application once it was in the open. Furthermore, Android, 
who at the time owned the Android Market where applications could be downloaded and 
bought, was unable to check the application to ensure it was free of malware. 
As a result, the Russians were able to manipulate this legitimate application with a 
malicious attachment and allow it to spread.108 The entity in Russia who is believed to 
have conducted this action is the cyber entity known as FANCY BEAR, who is thought to 
be part of the Russian Military Intelligence Agency, or the GRU. This is also the first time 
the GRU has been shown to manipulate Android operating software. To accomplish their 
attack, the GRU attached X-Agent malware to the application. X-Agent is a remote access 
 
106 CrowdStrike, “Fancy Bear Android Malware.” 
107 CrowdStrike.  
108 CrowdStrike. 
38 
toolkit that works against the operating systems of cellular phones.109 This malware 
allowed the GRU to target users of the application and gain “access to contacts, Short 
Message Service (SMS) text messages, call logs, and internet data […] FANCY BEAR 
would likely leverage this information for its intelligence and planning value.”110 
Effectively, the Russians used this malware to conduct cyber exploitation on the users’ 
phones. With this information, the Russians could “map out a unit’s composition and 
hierarchy, determine their plans, and even triangulate their approximate location.”111 The 
malware enabled the Russians to locate Ukrainian Artillery units which resulted in a clearer 
picture of the battlefield and the threat. This intelligence allowed the safer maneuver of 
separatist forces and the elimination of threat artillery systems. 
In a similar case, several Ukrainian programmers were developing a secure military 
communications and navigation program called Network Bridge which became the target 
of Russian cyberspace exploitation.112 This technology allowed Ukrainian soldiers to 
connect tablets holding gigabytes of topographical maps to tactical radios. The connection 
of these devices allowed soldiers to share tactical coordinates and messages securely 
throughout the battlefield. The programmers of this software team worked for a group 
called Army SOS. This entity continues to act as a fundraiser, donation collector, and 
technology support group to assist the Ukrainian Army.113 By mid-2015, thousands of 
soldiers were using Network Bridge and the profile of Army SOS was growing. The 
programmers at Army SOS were soon targeted by the GRU—FANCY BEAR. On August 
27, 2015, several dozen individuals who were contacts in one of the programmer’s Gmail 
accounts received emails encouraging them to download the newest version of Network 
Bridge. However, the programmer never sent the email. It is believed the Russians were 
able to break into the programmer’s email and send the message. The new version of 
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Network Bridge also had been modified with the “hidden ability to intercept messages and 
harvest GPS coordinates.”114 Fortunately, Gmail had flagged the infected emails. The 
Ukrainian programmers claimed the message was countered and the Russians’ plans were 
foiled as none of the infected software was downloaded, according to the programmers. 
Nevertheless, this attack shows Russia’s ability to infiltrate personal email accounts, 
manipulate applications, and deploy them through unassuming legitimate sources. It can 
be assumed the Russians used a similar stratagem in spreading a hacked version of the 
Ukrainian Fire Support Application. 
The Russians, specifically the GRU, have a history of using inauspicious programs 
and modifying them with malicious code. The 2018 Winter Olympic Games were also a 
target of the Russian cyber operation called Olympic Destroyer. The Russians were banned 
from the games over illegal doping to give their athletes an unfair advantage.115 In 
response, the Russians attacked the Winter Olympics being held in PyeongChang, South 
Korea. Olympic Destroyer cut off internet access, broadcast systems, the Olympics 
website, and ticket readers for many at the games during the opening ceremony.116 The 
malware used in this attack was unique, as it included code from previously used malware 
attributed to the Chinese, North Koreans, and Russians.117 The attack programs were 
deliberately manufactured to deceive those who would analyze it. Only after examining 
other components of the attack did it become apparent that Russia was the perpetrator.  
One of the clues that led experts to believe Russia was the guilty party in the 
Olympic Destroyer attack was a nefarious Microsoft Word document that was sent to the 
staff at the Olympic committee two months before the games began. The Word file had “a 
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list of VIP delegates to the games but hid inside it a malicious macro script, the same simple 
program-in-a-document trick [… that the GRU had been] using in 2014.” 118 By analyzing 
previous versions of similar tainted Word documents, the team of cybersecurity experts 
was able to locate a pattern of construction linking the Word document from the Olympic 
attack to previous Russian cyber-attacks. 
By using fake applications for mobile devices, the Russians were able to insert 
Monokle malware into other unsuspecting targets. Monokle was designed for “stealing 
personal data stored on an infected device and exfiltrating this information to command 
and control infrastructure.”119 This particular piece of malware was created to target 
mobile devices using the Android operating system. The spread of the malware by hiding 
on targeted devices is what made these actions so effective. The Russians created fake 
applications like Skype, Signal and even Pornhub that looked and operated like the actual 
application but contained malware. These applications are commonly used by soldiers for 
communication and entertainment. A security intelligence engineer at the cyber security 
company Lookout stated, “This is a common technique that malware developers use. They 
‘re-package’ a well-known application with malicious functionality so as not to arouse user 
suspicion.”120 By hiding malware in common applications, the Russians have shown their 
ability to deceive end users. 
Deception is an important component in cyber-attacks. As Gartzke and Lindsay put 
it, “Deception not only enables cyber attack, it is necessary: attackers who fail to be 
deceptive will find that the vulnerabilities on which they depend will readily be patched 
and access vectors will be closed.”121 Never before have so many gullible people been 
connected (through the internet) to something so vulnerable (computers and smartphones). 
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The access vectors open to cyber attackers are quite prolific. Malicious codes can be hidden 
in a variety of Microsoft Office tools (Word and PowerPoint) as well and PDF files, and 
even a recorded voicemail message. The GRU is successful in its cyber-attacks due to its 
ability to hide dangerous cyber tools in these innocent programs and files. The Russians 
had not only perfected the art of deception through computer programs, but also the 
exploitation of trusted sources. 
In the case of the Ukrainian Artillery Android Application, the Russians knew “a 
military member would only trust and use an application designed to calculate something 
as critical as targeting data if it was developed and promoted by a member of their own 
forces.”122 The deception had to look like it came from a trusted source within the 
Ukrainian military for it be effective. Network Bridge shows a similar strategy. The 
Russians used the email of one of the software programmers to introduce the malware 
infected version of Network Bridge. Victims would be more inclined to believe a 
programmer involved in the creation of the software telling them to download a newer 
version. The Olympic Destroyer attack was built on multiple layers of deception as well. 
The malware was disguised as an innocent Microsoft Word document. The malware was 
composed of different pieces of code from North Korea, China, and Russia. The makeup 
of Olympic Destroyer not only deceives a user into activating its nefarious programming 
because it is disguised as a benign attachment, but once open it is hard to decipher who 
created the malware. Even Monokle depended on the user downloading a Trojanized 
application that seemed legitimate to deceive the user, but contained malware. These 
techniques exploit vulnerabilities of the user, and allows attackers to easily gain access to 
key decision-makers, facilities, and other critical components. If the user of the technology 
is not cautious and vigilant, they will fall prey to cyberspace exploitation regardless of 
platform. Cell phones offer the Russians just one more entry point from which to unleash 
their weapons.  
The malicious modification of the Ukrainian Artillery Android Applications is but 
one example of a tool for cell phones being modified by a nefarious actor to exploit its 
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user. Fortunately, the developer of this application had a relatively small audience—
artillery leaders. As a result, the effects of Russian cyberspace exploitation were kept at a 
fairly low level. Another more popular application may have had much deeper 
consequences. However, the psychological effect of this type of hacking should not be 
underappreciated. Ukrainian soldiers may now question all of their electronic equipment 
as being hacked by the Russians. A soldier may feel hesitant to use technology, as the 
repercussions of turning on the system could enhance their digital signature and make them 
a target for a kinetic attack. Ultimately, cyber operations have effects on both the cognitive 
and physical aspects of warfare. 
F. AMERICAN EXAMPLE: TIKTOK VIDEO APPLICATION 
While all phones are susceptible to the effects of cyberspace exploitation, some of 
the most effective introduce these attacks through deception. The TikTok application 
represents one example of an effective cyberspace exploitation that is currently affecting 
the United States Department of Defense. According to its official website, “TikTok is the 
leading destination for short-form mobile video. Our mission is to inspire creativity and 
bring joy.”123 The application is immensely popular, with 1.4 billion downloads 
worldwide, and more than 120 million in the United States.124 However, lawmakers in the 
United States believe the application has a more sinister purpose. 
Members of Congress are concerned TikTok is censoring politically sensitive 
content (like the protests in Hong Kong). Furthermore, they are troubled with how TikTok 
stores the private data of its users and how China might use this information as a source of 
intelligence. United States Senator Marco Rubio stated in a tweet, “Any platform owned 
by a company in China which collects massive amounts of data on Americans is a potential 
serious threat to our country.”125 TikTok is not necessarily a platform for malware, but it 
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has the ability to collect information on its users and then share that data with its owners in 
a similar vein to what the X-agent malware does for the GRU. The Chinese may have 
perfected the use of deception in cyberspace exploitation. Instead of embedding malware 
to steal information in harmless files and programs, the Chinese have created an incredibly 
popular smartphone entertainment application to collect data and then used their own laws 
to allow the exploitation of that data and intelligence. 
On 1 June 2017, the Chinese Government approved the Cyber Security Law of the 
People’s Republic of China. These laws had some far-reaching and vague rules which all 
in China must obey. The laws “granted authorities the power to cut internet access in public 
security emergencies, and required data localization [sic] of servers in China as well as 
cyber security reviews of company data.”126 Furthermore, the law requires “internet 
company operators to cooperate with investigations involving criminal conduct and 
national security. Companies must give government investigators full access to their data 
if national security risks are suspected.”127 These laws allow the Chinese government 
access to the personal data of a country if it believes this data could assist in the national 
security of China. There was no clearly stated review process on what constitutes a 
“national security risk.” This vague terminology could be used to divulge data from any 
company in China, including TikTok, who is owned by the Chinese company Beijing 
ByteDance Technology. As a Chinese-owned company, ByteDance must ensure that it 
follows these laws.  
Due to the threat of its information collection for the Chinese government, the 
United States Department of Defense has banned TikTok on all government phones.128 
Many of the services have also encouraged its members to remove it from their personal 
phones. The United States Navy went a step further and stated that servicemembers with 
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TikTok on their phones or tablets would be blocked from accessing the Navy Marine Corp 
intranet.129 Recently, governments and citizens have voiced their concerns with privacy 
and big data collection from technology companies. The future of intelligence and 
cyberspace exploitation may lie in the creation of popular apps to collect data, which can 
then be analyzed and turned into intelligence, much like how cell phones can be exploited 
through malware today. 
G. OPERATIONAL SECURITY VULNERABILITIES 
Cybersecurity experts state the weakest link in any computer or technology-related 
security system is the end-user. If the owner of the device is not willing to change the 
password or update virus protection, then they will be responsible for the exploitation of 
the device. The same can be said of phone users. Often the owner fails to read the fine print 
and obligations associated with the use of various applications and software. Negligence 
on behalf of the user in regard to a phone and its applications is also a problem, as well as, 
the posting of sensitive information and the unintentional use of applications to give away 
the location of different formations and bases. These actions are commonly referred to as 
OPSEC violations. OPSEC is defined as “A capability that identifies and controls critical 
information, indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations, and 
incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting 
vulnerabilities.”130 Nevertheless, what the United States military wants to limit are OPSEC 
Indicators, which are, “Friendly detectable actions and open-source information that can 
be interpreted or pieced together by an adversary to derive critical information.”131 In 
terms of smartphones and users, the biggest concern is the posting of open source 
information that has the potential to give away sensitive data by troops and civilians. 
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Failure to apply basic OPSEC considerations can reveal important information to 
the enemy and other nefarious actors. Perhaps the best example of this occurring in Ukraine 
is with a Russian serviceman named Bato Dambaev, who was a member of the 37th 
Motorized Infantry Brigade (Kyakhta).132 During the initial stages of the conflict in 
Ukraine, the Russian government refused to acknowledge the presence of its military forces 
within the borders of Ukraine. On 16 April 2015, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian 
Federation, stated on his popular call-in show, “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin,” that, “I 
can tell you outright and unequivocally that there are no Russian troops in Ukraine.”133 
However, evidence of Russian involvement was found throughout Ukraine, as illustrated 
by the bodies of dead Russian citizens, Russian weapons, and in photos throughout the 
internet.134 
VICE News and the investigative service Bell¿ngcat (referred throughout this thesis 
as Bellingcat) which is, “an independent international collective of researchers, 
investigators and citizen journalists using open source and social media investigation to 
probe a variety of subjects,” tracked the movement of Bato and his unit into Ukraine.135 
Together these two entities created the documentary, Selfie Soldiers: Russia Checks into 
Ukraine. The documentary used geotagged photos posted by Bato on his VKontakte (VK), 
the Russian equivalent of Facebook, social media page. Bato’s photos documented his train 
up at various military facilities in Russia and his eventual deployment in Ukraine. The 
reporters retraced his steps by using photos from his VK account. Once they had found the 
correct location, the reporters would then recreate selfies at the same locations where Bato 
had initially taken the photos (see Figure 10).  
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By comparing Bato’s photos with the reenacted selfies, side by side, the 
documentary team proved that the Russian government had deployed troops within the 
legal borders of Ukraine.136 These actions showed the vulnerability of an unsuspecting 
end-user to give away crucial military information. The ignorance displayed by many 
people in terms of their digital footprint and the information they post to social media can 
cause a great deal of damage and can even have strategic implications. 
 
Journalist Simon Ostrovsky (right) re-creating one of Bato Dambaev’s 
personal photos from his deployment in Ukraine. 
Figure 10. Re-creation of Russian “Selfie” in Ukraine137 
Furthermore, the team at Bellingcat was also instrumental in determining the truth 
about what happened to Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17). A Malaysian Airways 
Boeing 777, civilian airliner crashed into the conflict region of Eastern Ukraine on 17 July 
2014.138 The aircraft carried 298 people whom all perished in the crash. The incident 
sparked fierce accusations among nations in the region and those who had citizens on board 
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the flight.139 These accusations initiated a major investigation into what caused the 
downing of the airliner. The evidence, in this case, included things outside the scope of 
typical aircraft crashes. While the physical debris would give important clues, other vital 
pieces of information were to be found within the information environment. 
 
The above image shows how a photograph (red frame) can be compared to a different photo 
(green frame) by using a flattening process to compare two images (yellow frame). 
Figure 11. Imagery Comparison of the Russian Buk Air Defense Missile Launcher140 
Bellingcat, using OSINT, again mostly from social media, was able to determine 
not just what country was responsible for the downing of the aircraft but what unit and 
which launcher was utilized in the illegal attack. In the aftermath of the MH17 crash, there 
was a large amount of activity on social media as well as photos and videos on the accused 
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Buk missile system being transported through the area.141 Using a collection of photos 
from different sources and different image manipulation software, as well as geolocation 
techniques, and embedded photo timestamps, Bellingcat recreated the route the launcher 
took into eastern Ukraine and determined its presence on 17 July 2014. On the date of the 
aircraft crash, the launcher was located in an area where it would have been able to engage 
MH17. On 18 July, the same launcher was photographed leaving the area with one of its 
missiles missing. The main give away of the vehicle was its number (see Figure 11). In 
many militaries throughout the world, each vehicle has what is referred to as a bumper 
number. This number allows each unique vehicle to be identified despite being the same 
general type of vehicle. With the bumper number and other unique features of the offending 
launcher, Bellingcat could track the vehicles as it moved through eastern Ukraine and 
eventually back to its base in Kursk, Russia. 
Furthermore, Bellingcat was able to identify the unit and then built up its chain of 
command through social media posts made by its members. To determine who on social 
media was a part of the unit, the “Bellingcat team used photos of badges, patches, emblems, 
other symbols visible on the soldiers’ uniforms as well as flags and other distinguishing 
objects in order to determine in which unit a soldier was or is currently serving.”142 From 
this information, it became evident that the unit responsible for the attack was the 53rd Anti-
Aircraft Missile Brigade. These unique objects proved critical in differentiating what unit 
troops were assigned. Also interesting is Bellingcat’s discovery of an online forum used by 
the mothers, wives, and girlfriends of the soldiers in the 53rd Brigade.143 Their posts 
revealed the names of several members of the unit and gave details about where the unit 
was going and the activities they conducted. The names of these soldiers helped the 
investigators to find their social media profiles, which unearthed more names and more 
members of the Brigade. When examining the social media profiles of the different 
soldiers, Bellingcat would also look at their mutual friends and look for other connections 
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to see who else would be a part of the 53rd Brigade. Eventually, Bellingcat was able to 
recreate the 53rds chain of command (see Figure 12). Their investigative work was given 
to the Joint Investigative Team lead by the Dutch and is being used by the prosecution in 
their current court case over who is culpable in the downing of flight MH17. 
 
Figure 12. The 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade Chain of Command as 
Discovered by Bellingcat144 
 
144 Source: Romein, 110. 
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The MH17 incident and the work done by Bellingcat show several vectors for 
OPSEC exploitation. Even though posts to social media and the tagging of photos is fairly 
obvious, more interesting is the exploitation of military forums for spouses, relatives, and 
friends. These can be treasure-troves of information. The users of these forums often have 
little to no OPSEC training and could give away some extremely valuable information.  
It is a common practice among military members to change their names on social  
media platforms. However, Bellingcat has shown that by comparing mutual friends  
through different social media platforms that the true identity of a user can be found 
relatively easily.  
H. AMERICAN EXAMPLE: STRAVA FITNESS APPLICATION 
The United States is not immune to these violations of operational security. 
Recently, some classified facilities in the United States Central Command region were 
exposed by personnel using fitness applications on their smartwatches. Strava is a fitness 
networking application that “turns every iPhone and Android into a sophisticated running 
and cycling computer (and we work with your GPS watches and head units, too). Start 
Strava before an activity and you can track your favorite performance stats, and afterwards, 
dive deep into your data.”145 Many of these devices use the internal geolocation software 
of a user’s phone or fitness tracking device to measure the distance and speed of a user’s 
workout. These devices are then linked through a social media-like platform to a network 
of other users to display statistics and locations. The Strava application allows the user to 
comment, share, attach photos, and look at popular workout locations. This is troublesome 
when one is looking at OPSEC concerns. Many of these features, which are enjoyable in 
the civilian world, can have disastrous consequences on the battlefield. 
One feature of Strava is its “Heatmap,” which examines geographic location by the 
amount of exercise activity that occurs within it. Strava states “The heatmap shows ‘heat’ 
made by aggregated, public activities over the last two years.”146 When examining the heat 
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map, one can see vastly illuminated areas within Europe, the United States, Brazil, and 
other developed areas of the world. When one examines conflict zones, the map is dark 
due to a lack of tracked activity. However, if these areas are zoomed in, one would find 
small pockets of activity. Service members on small remote bases used Strava to record 
their workouts and inadvertently gave away the location of their secretive facilities.  
An Australian University student was the first to publish these findings after 
discovering them in November of 2017.147 Nathan Ruser stated that he got the idea after 
his father mentioned the Heatmap showed “where rich white people are” located on earth. 
From that, he began to wonder if the map could be used to find U.S. military personnel. 
Once Ruser posted his observations to Twitter, others began to look for and find secret 
U.S. bases. Even more troubling is that the device also tracked patrol routes of U.S. troops. 
Since many people are concerned with step counts and tracking distances, many soldiers 
would leave the devices on during patrols in combat areas. The activity was recorded and 
then added to the Heatmap. 
Strava unintentionally collected what intelligence analysts call a pattern of life. 
From the Heatmap, one could locate isolated secret bases, track the perimeter of the bases, 
find where soldiers conducted physical fitness, and observe patrol routes. All of these 
datapoints could be used by nefarious forces to target U.S. bases and units while they were 
out on a mission. 
I. CONCLUSION 
Through much of the 20th century, soldiers were told not to smoke at night as the 
glowing embers could give away their position. For years, the military stressed “light and 
noise discipline” when in a field environment. This meant when on patrol, soldiers could 
not smoke or talk freely for fear the enemy would notice their presence. In today’s modern 
battlefield, a smartphone and some careless posts on social media may have a similar effect 
for a smart adversary. The tactical consequences of Bluetooth technology (or any other 
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electronic signature from a smartphone) might be similar to those of cigarettes in 21st-
century combat. Small unit leaders must enforce strict control over the use of cellular and 
smartphones by their subordinates. Armed with the knowledge of the repercussions from 
the careless use of personal electronic devices, troops should be more apt to curtail the use 
of their devices in the tactical arena.  
The examples from the Russian Invasion of Ukraine in 2014 show the vulnerability 
of cellular and smartphones to troops on the battlefield. The use of flying IMSI Catchers 
to send targeted propaganda messages to the personal phones of soldiers is a challenge 
American forces have never faced. The hacking of useful mobile device applications, like 
the Ukrainian Artillery Android Application, to expose the user location or other 
information is another challenge American military personnel have not had to contend with 
in battle. Finally, while military leaders understand the risk of OPSEC, its effects are not 
clearly articulated to lower-level troops. This is illustrated clearly in the social media posts 
of Bato Dambaev and the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade as they operated in 
Ukraine despite President Putin saying otherwise causing international uproar and creating 
strategic problems for the Russian government to face. With an understanding of current 
vulnerabilities, the United States needs to look at future threats from cellular and 
smartphones in order to form effective solutions to this dire problem. 
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IV. THE FUTURE THREAT OF CELLULAR AND 
SMARTPHONES 
While the current vulnerabilities from the use of cellular phones have proven to be 
dangerous and troublesome, the future may become even more perilous. New technologies 
currently exist that are on the brink of changing the way people retrieve and use 
information. The development of 5G networks and the creation of the IoT have the promise 
of making life better. However, the emergence of 5G network exploits, deepfake video, 
and other technologies will also shift how mobile devices can be manipulated. This chapter 
will examine the future vulnerabilities of cellular and smartphones to military 
organizations. The chapter will examine each future vulnerability by using the same 
framework of threats used in the Ukrainian case study of propaganda, offensive cyberspace 
operations, and OPSEC concerns. By examining the risk of future cellphone use in the 
military through these three vulnerabilities, one can gain a better understanding of how 
future technology may affect troops on the battlefield 
A. PROPAGANDA 
Actions in Ukraine have presented new vectors for propaganda. While electronic 
messaging is nothing new, the ability to effectively target specific segments of a group, or 
certain individuals, is a recent advancement in propaganda. Tailoring messages to specific 
individuals will ensure that propaganda continues to evolve and become more effective. 
Libicki, in 1995, envisioned improvements to psychological operations by “telling soldiers 
that their wives are sleeping around [ … which would be] more effective if those at home 
can be identified by name. [… This] would be easier in advanced societies, which these 
days generate enormous computer-kept files on almost everyone.”148 The use of specific 
names to precisely target propaganda will make it significantly more effective. The 
“enormous computer kept files” that Libicki speaks of exist in the United States in the form 
of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Unfortunately for many members of the 
United States military, the Chinese government already has this data. 
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The stealing of valuable information from the Office of Personnel Management, 
commonly referred to as the OPM hack, may prove to have been one of the most effective 
cyberspace exploitations against the United States. In 2014, the Chinese successfully 
conducted two cyberspace exploitations on “U.S. government databases holding personnel 
records and security-clearance files which exposed sensitive information about at least 22.1 
million people, including not only federal employees and contractors but their families and 
friends.”149 One of the most important pieces of data collected by the Chinese was the 
Standard Form 86 or SF86, which is a questionnaire every person applying for a security 
clearance must complete. This includes government workers, military personnel, and 
contractors. The SF86 is used to gather information for security investigators to ensure the 
applicant is not a threat and can be trusted with classified information. The data on this 
form includes the contact information and personally identifiable information of close 
family members, trusted friends, and colleagues. Thus, the OPM collected a completed 
SF86 for every person who applied for a security clearance in the United States.  
The Chinese now have the contact information of all these personnel and some of their 
most trusted associates. With this treasure trove of information, the Chinese have achieved 
the capability that Libicki postulated about twenty-five years ago and ensured their 
intelligence apparatus could target U.S. military personnel and their families with 
propaganda and threats. 
These messages could have significant effects on the battlefield and in military 
operations. Imagine a U.S. Naval vessel conducting freedom of navigation operations 
along the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Then imagine the ranking naval officer 
receiving an ultimatum via his phone or other device threatening the life of his family if he 
does not leave the area and cease his ‘infringement’ into Chinese territory. What if a 
number of the enlisted crew received these messages? The result could be widespread panic 
or a possible mutiny. Messages like this could be used to prevent U.S. military incursions 
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and influence in contested areas. It could also be used to prevent the military from 
conducting joint training with partner forces. 
In addition to risking the success of military operations, targeted messages could 
also be used in the diplomatic and intelligence realm. With the OPM information, it would 
be easy for China or other countries to locate and exploit intelligence personnel located in 
nearby U.S. embassies. With the contact information of the close relatives of every person 
who has a clearance, attackers could piece together who works at the different embassies 
and then target them and their families. The messages may vary from physical threats to 
‘False Flag operations,’ which are attempts to recruit intelligence operatives to join what 
they are being told is a U.S. Operation that is actually being run by another nation.  
While the loss of intelligence assets and diplomatic officials is alarming, the 
unknown actor who possesses this data represents the real danger. The information gained 
from the OPM hack may have been shared with other countries and even some non-state 
actors. This valuable data has the ability to threaten the United States with detailed 
information necessary for counterforce psychological operations on U.S. personnel at 
many different levels within the government.  
Deepfake videos that manipulate audio and visual information are another possible 
type of propaganda. The term deep fake comes from the combination of “deep learning,” 
a subset of machine learning, and “fake news.”150 The use of deception to get people to do 
things they normally would never do is not a new idea. However, technology has now 
reached a point where video images can be manipulated to deceive a viewer into believing 
something that is not true.151 The comedian and writer Jordan Peele demonstrated this by 
taking a video of former President Barack Obama and modifying it so as to make him say 
things he would never say in real life.152 The video also highlights the dangers of deep 
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fakes and the need to be critical of the information one consumes and shares. The imagery 
of Jordan Peele’s video was seamless, and it appeared as if it was actual footage of 
President Obama saying outlandish things. Mobile streaming and video services continue 
to become more popular and the consumption of this video is staggering. Nearly “500 hours 
of video are uploaded to YouTube every minute [… and people] watch over 1 billion hours 
of YouTube videos a day, more than Netflix and Facebook video combined.”153 Mobile 
devices, including phones and tablets, represent 70% of YouTube’s total views.154 With 
these statistics, one can see how online videos can be used to reach large audiences in a 
short period of time. 
The use of video to propagate deepfakes through vast segments of the population 
allows targeted propaganda to infect the battlefield and civilians on the home front. 
Alternately, at the strategic level, the United States could fabricate a deepfake video of an 
enemy national leader stating, “The war is over and the military needs to surrender,” this 
could be an effective way of dissolving enemy military resistance and decreasing support 
for the war within the enemy populous. At a more tactical level, deepfake videos could be 
created and spread of individual unit commanders giving similar surrender messages to 
troops to degrade the fighting power of smaller units. These videos have the potential to 
lower the number of enemy forces the United States would have to fight due to desertion 
and surrender. In a more sinister capacity, the deepfakes might be used to degrade an ally 
with the United States.155 False video of world leaders insulting partner countries could be 
used to erode support for coalitions or alliances. Deepfakes could segment populations 
along traditional rifts (race, sex, income, or social level) in order to decrease support for 
governments or to shift focus to internal issues and allow another country the freedom to 
act as it pleases on the international stage. 
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By mixing deepfake video technology and information from the OPM hack, 
combined with effective influence techniques used by the Russians in the 2016 election, it 
becomes nearly impossible to separate fact from fiction. The use of phones and other 
devices to spread these false video messages and propaganda only makes matters worse. 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine have shown the threats posed to soldiers at the tactical level. 
As these actions are studied and improved with new technology, the effects of these 
deception operations can easily be upgraded to the national and strategic level.156  
B. CYBERSPACE EXPLOITATION 
The ability to conduct cyberspace attack and cyberspace exploitation will increase 
in importance for nations and non-state actors as the world continues to connect itself 
through the internet and other modernized networks. The development and implementation 
of 5th Generation mobile networks and the rise of the IoT will create new vectors for 
attackers to execute their operations. The growth of the internet and the development of 
new networks may close some older access points for cyberspace attacks, but it will surely 
open new vulnerabilities for exploitation. 
Future attack methods have already been developed by university students and 
researchers to utilize exploits in 5G technology. The Tracking via Paging mEssage 
DistributiOn (TORPEDO) attack utilizes an exploit in 4G and the current version of 5G 
through the use of “paging.”157 When a mobile device receives a call or text message, it 
needs an alert to move it out of its energy-saving mode. This process is called “paging.” 
When there are multiple pages, “the network’s Mobile Management Entry (MME) asks 
base station(s) to broadcast a paging message, which includes the Temporary Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (TMSI) of the device. The TMSI is assigned by the MME [… and 
should change] frequently.”158 Unfortunately, the TMSI, in practice, is rarely changed for 
each phone. As a result, an attacker can call a phone multiple times and, while looking at 
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the paging messages, find the most frequent TMSI to conclude the victim is present in a 
given area. Text messages can also be used as a catalyst to send pages to the victim’s 
device. With this information, an attacker can locate a user from their TMSI. To be 
successful, an attacker needs a pattern of life for their victim. Once the attacker knows the 
“victim’s often-visited locations, then the attacker can set up sniffers on those locations to 
create the victim’s cell-level mobility profile.”159 This information allows an attacker to 
know when a victim is in the area and if their device is operating. Attackers can “hijack the 
paging channel, enabling them to send fabricated emergency messages, mount a denial-of-
service attack by injecting fabricated, empty paging messages, and thus blocking the victim 
from receiving any [calls or text messages].”160 Many people believe that with the latest 
5G technology that their devices will be safe, but TORPEDO shows that any device is 
capable of exploitation. 
TORPEDO attacks can act as the precursor to other types of cyberspace 
exploitations on current 4G and future 5G phones such as Persistent Information ExposuRe 
by the CorE network (PIERCER).161 The attacker uses TORPEDO to find the victim and 
ensure their mobile device is activated. Following the TORPEDO attack, the aggressor can 
then use the PIERCER to obtain the victim’s IMSI on 4G networks. Some communications 
companies use IMSIs instead of the TMSI for their pages. By conducting some tests, 
researchers “revealed that it is possible to give the service provider the impression that the 
exceptional case [the use of IMSI instead of the approved TMSI for paging] is occurring 
which forces it to reveal the victim’s IMSI.”162  PIERCER uses the inherent vulnerability 
of using IMSIs during paging to allow attackers to obtain a user’s IMSI. Acquiring the 
IMSI allows older previously discovered attacks to be executed on the 4G platform. 
In the case of a more secure 5G network and a service provider that practices proper 
protocol by using TMSI for paging instead of the more vulnerable IMSI, an attacker can 
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use IMSI Cracking to obtain the victim’s IMSI. Following a successful TORPEDO attack, 
where the service provider uses TMSIs, the aggressor can utilize IMSI Cracking which 
conducts a brute-force attack on the victim’s device to obtain their IMSI.163 With the IMSI 
acquired, attackers can use conventional IMSI Catchers eavesdrop on victims’ calls and 
discover their location “even if the victim owns a brand new 5G handset.”164 However, 
these attacks have their limitations and can take a long time to execute—IMSI Cracking 
can take up to thirteen hours.165  
The vulnerabilities exploited by Russia in the 2G environment of Ukraine in 2014 
can, unfortunately, be replicated with new cyber weapons such as TORPEDO and IMSI 
Cracking in the modern 5G environment.166 The creation of these cyber weapons shows 
the vulnerability of any mobile device and network. It can be assured that motivated 
hackers will continue to refine these attacks and their necessary equipment to make them 
more efficient for more elaborate operations. 
Embassies and diplomatic missions throughout the world have been used as 
projection points for espionage and they may also soon be jumping-off points for 
cyberspace exploitation. Using modern attack methods and IMSI Catchers, it is possible 
that a country could collect mobile device information and broadcast messages as shown 
by illegal cellular stations in China and Russian drones in Ukraine. Such actions have 
already been uncovered in Washington, DC, by the Israelis. Politico reported that Stingray 
devices “formally called international mobile subscriber identity-catchers or IMSI-
catchers, […] capture the contents of calls and data use. The devices were likely intended 
to spy on President Donald Trump, one of the former officials said, as well as his top aides 
 
163 Gareth Corfield, “Latest 4G, 5G Phone-Location Slurp Attack Is a Doozy, but Won’t Torpedo 
Average Joe or Jane,” The Register, February 26, 2019, www.theregister.co.uk/2019/02/26/
torpedo_piercer_attacks/. 
164 Kumar, “New Attacks against 4G.”  
165 Hussain et al., “Privacy Attacks,” 2. 




and closest associates.”167 Intelligence organizations will always seek ways to exploit the 
newest forms of technology.  
The spread of 5G technology has been controversial for the United States and its 
allies. The Chinese through Huawei have become one of the leaders in propagating 5G 
technology throughout the world.168 The United States remains skeptical of the security of 
current 5G networks developed by Huawei. Leaders in the United States are wary of the 
information that moves through the Hauwai 5G network can be collected and then acted 
upon by the Chinese government.169 While the thought of another great power using 5G 
to collect intelligence is unsettling, the reason for its creation, the IoT, may have greater 
vulnerabilities than the network itself. 
The IoT is facilitated by the development of faster 5G Network Technology. As 
more objects are connected to the internet, more attack vectors are opened to hackers 
around the world. Robert Spalding stated, “5G is not just for refrigerators. It’s farm 
implements, it’s airplanes, it’s all kinds of different things that can actually kill people or 
that allow someone to reach into the network and direct those things to do what they want 
them to do. It’s a completely different threat that we’ve never experienced before.”170 Just 
like the sudden introduction and consumption of mobile devices, one can expect similar 
results with new devices and the IoT. However, with this sudden influx of new technology 
comes a sizable lag in the introduction of effective patches and virus detection software.171  
Furthermore, each of these new devices that are created for the IoT has unique 
characteristics and programming which make it difficult for a universal type of virus 
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detection system. Currently, some of the most common platforms used to gain entry for 
hackers include: wireless cameras, baby monitors, smart thermostats, and smart door locks 
(Ring systems).172 It is only a matter of time before devices like Amazon’s Alexa and 
Google Home’s smart speakers are also exploited.  
An attack on the IoT may prove to be easier than contemporary cyber-attacks. M. 
Carlton, the vice president of research at Senrio, a network security company, stated that 
attacks through the IoT show “why it’s important to know what’s really on your network. 
These devices are all connected to each other and can create a hole in the network. It would 
be very difficult to catch this.”173 Instead of hobbling together malware code from various 
sources, a hacker may be able to bypass the deception means by exploiting easy attack 
vectors inside the everyday objects and appliances that are connected to the internet.  
Using an attack strategy similar to a Rube Goldberg device where a complicated 
mix of many individual devices are used to perform a simple task, the hacker jumps from 
device to device until it hits the actual system or network it was targeting. Ang Chui, the 
CEO of the cyber security company Red Balloon, expands on this idea by stating, “We’re 
looking at a fitness tracker hacking a smart speaker, a smart speaker hacking a thermostat, 
and the thermostat hacking the rest of the network. It’s all laughs until that thermostat 
connects to a power plant or an embassy.”174 An attacker may no longer need to invest 
extensive resources into hacking a secure phone or computer. Instead, they could execute 
a chain of attacks on more vulnerable systems to get to their end goal. The future threat of 
offensive cyberspace operations will continue to grow with the advent of more effective 
attack methods and the greater number of vulnerabilities found within the IoT.  
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C. OPSEC CONCERNS 
In the past, attackers sought members of the opposing military to gain information 
about their future actions, but recently, their family members and friends have also become 
targets. In the future, the target of OPSEC vulnerabilities could even become the general 
public. The actions of Bellingcat in providing evidence that shows Russia shot down MH17 
is an excellent example of this phenomenon of OSINT investigations targeted at the 
population and not just the military. The general population has little, if any, knowledge of 
OPSEC. Militaries with trained personnel have a hard-enough time keeping their troops 
from posting critical information online. The general populace with little or no training in 
information security is more vulnerable. With the increased number of sensors (wireless 
cameras, phone cameras, door cameras, etc.) that are connected every day, as well as free 
OSINT investigative training that people receive on collecting, the value of targeting the 
general populous for information becomes significantly more valuable. 
Concerns with OPSEC will grow as the world continues to connect through the 
internet and more sensors (mobile phone cameras, wireless cameras, etc.) propagate homes, 
offices, transportation, public and private places. These changes to the information 
environment may make covert operations significantly more difficult. Bellingcat has 
illustrated the effectiveness of OSINT investigations to collect information and use it to 
track the Russian 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade’s movements through Ukraine. The 
ability of militaries to move without attracting attention will become increasingly difficult 
as the number of people installing wireless cameras and entryway sensors will continue to 
rise. A marketing study by Statistics Market Research Consulting showed a growth rate in 
the industry of 9.6%.175 As more cameras propagate the world, there will be more sensors 
to view what is occurring. These additional sensors will make military movements harder 
to conceal. The rise of OSINT investigative training may become the next education fad 
within tech. 
 





Bellingcat offers workshops around the world on OSINT investigative techniques. 
These are five-day classes, where “the first two days will focus on investigations of videos 
and photographic content, and the third day will focus on social media investigation. The 
last two days allow the participant to apply those skills to topics of their choice, with 
assistance from the workshop leaders and Bellingcat team members.”176 Currently, 
Bellingcat offers these classes predominantly for journalists and members of Non-
Governmental Organizations. Intelligence and military members are prohibited from 
attending. Furthermore, these classes are quite expensive; they are currently offered at 
2,200 Euros per attendee. While this price may limit participation from some who are 
interested, Bellingcat offers free guides on its website. These guides cover topics like 
geolocation techniques for Google Earth, interpreting data from Strava’s heatmaps, and a 
how-to guide for reverse image searches. The world may see a rise in OSINT investigators 
similar to the rise of hackers with the increase of mainstream home computer use. The 
increase of sensors and trained personnel to decipher and use that data will make military 
operations a challenge and increase the value of targeting the civilian population to create 
useful OPSEC exploits.  
The intentional targeting of the general population with new malware promises to 
use phones in new ways to gather relevant intelligence information through OPSEC 
vulnerabilities. PlaceRaider is an example of malware that can be used to target the mobile 
phones of a country’s population to conduct remote reconnaissance or “virtual theft” within 
physical spaces.177 The hacker instructs the device to take a series of pictures from a cell 
phone and fits them together to create a complete image of a room or space. In essence, 
this malware turns a phone with a camera into a covert reconnaissance device. PlaceRaider 
collects images “using remote services on the mobile device. On board preprocessing 
performs gross data reduction and packaging for transmission. The model is generated off-
 
176 “New Bellingcat Workshops Announced for May–September 2020,” Bellingcat, March 4, 2020, 
www.bellingcat.com/resources/events/2020/02/24/new-bellingcat-workshops-announced-for-may-
september-2020/. 
177 Robert Templeman, Zahid Rahman, David Crandall, and Apu Kapadia, “PlaceRaider: Virtual 
Theft in Physical Spaces with Smartphones,” NDSS Symposium (2013): 1, https://www.ndss-
symposium.org/ndss2013/ndss-2013-programme/placeraider-virtual-theft-physical-spaces-smartphones/. 
64 
board and is navigated with a tool that allows exploration in a realistic 3D environment 
that provides an easy method to mine the image set. The malicious actor can easily extract 
sensitive information.”178 The malware operates by taking random images with the 
infected device’s own camera and then minimizes the file size to ease the transport of 
images back to a centralized location for examination. Coupling this form of malware with 
an IMSI catcher would allow the attacker to identify the location of different victims and 
then allow the malware to be triggered on victims’ nearby areas of interest. Thus, as people 
walking by a targeted structure, the IMSI catcher could find their phone and the 
PlaceRaider application could be activated as the victim walks past. This form of malware 
would allow the targeting of certain areas or units from unsuspecting victims without 
risking any military assets. The use of malware on civilians to gain intelligence through 
OPSEC violation may be the next vulnerability of cellular and smartphones. 
Ukraine has shown the dangers of OPSEC vulnerabilities by soldiers and their 
families when they have posted things to social media. These vulnerabilities were then 
exploited by reporters and OSINT investigators, like Bellingcat. The result was an 
embarrassment for Russia, as it was shown they had utilized troops in Ukraine and that a 
Russian unit shot down a Malaysian Airways jetliner. As the ordinary citizen becomes 
more connected and proficient with the digital technology around them, instead of targeting 
the opposing force, attackers may choose to target the unsuspecting populations for OPSEC 
vulnerabilities and use new technology to exploit them. Similar targeting shifts have been 
seen in the use of strategic bombing. Originally, aerial bombing was used against military 
targets, but then shifted to civilians in an effort to diminish the will to resist. It will be 
interesting to see what happens when a population realizes it is being exploited via its 
mobile devices. The bombing of London did not work for the Germans, the bombing of 
Japanese cities did little to wither the fighting spirit of the Japanese,179 and the bombing 
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of Hanoi did little to curb the fighting in Vietnam.180 How will the targeting of a population 
through cyberspace affect the outcome of a battle?   
The future structure of tactical military intelligence may also change due to these 
new vulnerabilities. While some units operating in current conflict zones may be 
accustomed to signals intelligence personnel within their formations, the creation of new 
tactical level cyber soldiers in units may become the norm. The work pioneered by 1st 
Stryker Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division during their 2017 National Training Center 
(NTC) rotation shows the utility of a Cyber Reconnaissance team to scour OSINT looking 
for information on the enemy.  
Since 1981, the U.S. Army has sent its Armored Brigade Combat Teams to NTC at 
Fort Irwin, California to fight the Opposing Force (OPFOR). The OPFOR, or 11th Armored 
Cavalry Regiment, is a specially designed Army unit to replicate possible threat forces.181 
The purpose of the unit is to create a cunning and effective enemy to ensure visiting units 
are prepared to face similar foes in the rigors of combat. In June of 2017, prior to arriving 
at Fort Irwin, the visiting unit, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, 
created a “Cyber Reconnaissance team” in an attempt to outmaneuver and defeat the 
OPFOR.182 The team was tasked with locating any pertinent information to defeat the 
OPFOR within the OSINT realm. While not every means to collect OSINT was available, 
the team used a variety of social media platforms (Facebook, Tinder, and Snapchat) as well 
as the Department of Defense media site, Dvidshub, to find relevant information. 
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Using OSINT analyzation techniques similar to Bellingcat, the Cyber 
Reconnaissance team scoured Dvidshub for useful information. Dvidshub is a collection 
of photos and videos from around the Department of Defense. By searching the database 
for the 11th Cavalry and then sifting through images and videos, the team identified key 
OPFOR leaders and weapon systems before the deployment to Fort Irwin began. Similar 
techniques proved valuable in establishing the OPFOR composition and hierarchy. 
Dvidshub contained enough relevant information to allow the Cyber Reconnaissance team 
to gain an understanding of the enemy, but it was collected passively and depended on 
what the OPFOR had posted to the website. To get actionable intelligence on the location 
of the OPFOR, the team had to become more proactive. 
Throughout the course of the exercise, the team would locate the OPFOR and 
provide timely intelligence through the use of social media platforms. The two most 
effective platforms were Snapchat and Tinder. These applications are commonly used by 
young adults who are looking for partners. Snapchat is a photographic modification and 
communication application that can attach photos to a map so people nearby or around the 
world can view them.183 Tinder is a dating application that uses geolocation to link 
possible matches.184 These applications are especially popular with users between 
eighteen and twenty-four years of age, which make up a large portion of the military (35% 
of Tinder users185 and 78% of Snapchat users186 are between 18 and 24). The team created 
fake online personas for both applications that acted as “honey pots” to deceive targets and 
encouraged them to divulge relevant information. Members of the Cyber Reconnaissance 
team stated, “by creating a fake female Tinder profile and querying young Soldiers, we 
could collect important information pertaining to OPFOR units in the field. Information 
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requested included unit affiliation, weapons, assets, and locations relative to the battlefield 
and terrain.”187  
Tinder was valuable for finding OPFOR locations because it automatically 
calculates the distance between the user and their match. By going to three previously 
known locations the Cyber Reconnaissance team triangulated their matches in the OPFOR. 
Over 100 soldiers in the OPFOR inadvertently contributed their location data which 
allowed for constant updates to their location. The one downside of this method is that 
Tinder rounds distance to the nearest whole mile. This created some ambiguity that was 
rectified with the assistance of Snapchat. 
Snapchat introduced the Snap Map on 21 June 2017.188 This feature allows a user 
to find another friended user precisely on a map. It also has a heat map feature, similar to 
the Strava health application, that shows the activity level of all the Snapchat users 
throughout the world. The heat map records activity over a twenty-four-hour period. In 
large cities these changes would be relatively minor. However, in the mostly desolate desert 
locale of Fort Irwin, California, the team was able to see the location and movements of 
OPFOR elements when the data was viewed over time (see Figure 13). The information 
collected by the Cyber Reconnaissance team allowed their unit to refine the locations of 
enemy forces, which assisted in the targeting and aided in the route selection of friendly 
forces. 
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This map shows the location of Snapchat 
activity (in blue and light green) which 
corresponds with OPFOR positions within the 
Fort Irwin, California, training area. 
Figure 13. Snap Map from the Cyber Reconnaissance Team189 
The ability to use social media to develop a common operating picture of the 
battlefield and find the location of enemy units is shocking. The same things that young 
adults are using to find possible mates in the civilian world are being used by military 
intelligence personnel to locate enemy units in the realm of battle. Members of the Cyber 
Reconnaissance team stated the achievements from their intelligence collecting techniques 
“were the result of flaws in operational security. Moving forward, we [the U.S. Military] 
must understand the gravity of OSINT.”190 Threats to OPSEC are all around. It should be 
clear that innocent devices and applications can have significant consequences to a well-
motivated enemy. Vulnerabilities to OPSEC do not just come from phones and other 
devices; the human aspect is even more troublesome. Soldiers that gave away their position 
from carelessly looking at their phone and scrolling through Tinder and Snapchat had 
briefings and received training on OPSEC. The family members of these soldiers have 
received no such training. As shown by the family members of the 53rd Anti-Aircraft 
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Missile Brigade, they are even riper for exploitation through their devices and ignorance. 
While a Cyber Reconnaissance team may prove less useful against a well-disciplined and 
modernized military, it would be very effective against less disciplined proxy forces. Then 
again, as this thesis has already explored, U.S. and Russian troops are quite susceptible to 
OPSEC traps through social media. Who is to say that Chinese or Iranian military personnel 
are any better? 
The vulnerabilities from cellular and smartphones will continue to increase and 
have far-reaching effects for troops on the battlefield as well as the governments that deploy 
them and the citizens that support them. The effect of deepfake video combined with 
individualized information from previous cyberspace exploitation will most likely be 
significant in terms of creating effective propaganda to degrade combat forces. The rise of 
5G will continue to allow attackers to exploit mobile networks with new methods. The IoT 
will become a more vulnerable pathway as more devices are connected. Each of these 
devices will then become a new attack vector allowing hackers to gain access to networks 
through a chain of easily exploited electronic gadgets. OPSEC will become harder to 
achieve as more cameras are added to the potential battlespace, as private individuals 
become more capable of collecting and deciphering OSINT information, and as the 
electronic signature of users through common applications are exploited to find their 
location. The target of OSINT collection may shift from the opposing military to the 
civilians of the opponent as they become better sensors than enemy troops. The 
vulnerabilities of cellular and smartphones on the battlefield is apparent. The next chapter 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
71 
V. PRESCRIPTIVE MEASURES 
In April of 2018, Jeff Bezos, the owner of Amazon and the wealthiest person in the 
world, had dinner with Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia. During 
that dinner, the two men exchanged phone numbers associated with their respective 
messaging application accounts on “WhatsApp.”191 The next month, Mr. Bezos received 
a WhatsApp message, originating from the Crown Prince, with a video file that had been 
modified with spyware. Several hours after receiving the message, “massive and (for 
Bezos’ phone) unprecedented exfiltration of data from the phone began.” 192 Saudi Arabia, 
during this time period, had also infiltrated the phones of several political activists, 
dissidents, and non-government organization workers who were vocal against the Saudi 
regime. Several months later, Mr. Bezos received a photo of a woman who bears a strong 
similarity to the woman with whom he was having an affair. The photo was sent to him 
months before this information was known publicly.193 The United Nations investigation 
into the matter believed Saudi Arabia targeted Bezos due to his ownership of the 
Washington Post newspaper and its support of Jamal Khashoggi, who was an outspoken 
critic of, and later murdered by, the regime.194 The phone of the world’s wealthiest person, 
who presumably had some of the best security and cyber protection money can buy, was 
hacked. What then can be done to protect the average soldier, who has significantly fewer 
resources on the battlefield? 
Threats to phones pose a severe vulnerability to the United States military. 
However, there are several ways to mitigate their effects. The most obvious solution is to 
prohibit all phones and other personally owned internet-attached devices for military 
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personnel. Another necessary step is to improve the education and training of service 
members as it relates to cellular and smartphone vulnerabilities. The user is the weakest 
link to any technical device, and the military needs to ensure its personnel understand the 
extent of these threats and are prepared to counter them. Finally, the United States military 
needs to ensure its partner forces and allies are aware of the vulnerabilities of phone use 
and are prepared to respond to the effects of these devices. 
A. BANNING PHONES 
Cell phones and other mobile devices could simply be prohibited for troops who 
are deployed. By removing phones and other personal mobile devices, the threats and 
vulnerabilities they introduce are eliminated. The United States Army’s 82d Airborne 
Division recently executed such a policy ahead of its short notice deployment to Kuwait in 
January 2020.195 The 1st Brigade Combat Team of the 82d Airborne Division was to be 
sent to Kuwait due to escalating tensions between the United States and Iran following 
rocket attacks on American facilities and the elimination of Iranian Quds Force commander 
General Qassem Soleimani. The 82d Airborne Division Commander, Major General James 
Mingus, stated, “This is not the normal kind of deployment. The decision [to not bring 
personal electronic devices is] 100 percent an operational security and force protection 
measure.”196  The prohibition on personal electronic devices was to stem the flow of 
information leaking out about the deployment—preventing OPSEC violations. It was also 
conducted to protect soldiers from the effects of enemy cyberattacks—targets of 
cyberspace exploitation operations.  
The 82d Airborne Division’s decision to not bring personal electronic devices was 
most likely made based on a National Terrorism Advisory Bulletin, issued after the attack 
that killed Solemani. The bulletin stated, “Iran maintains a robust cyber program and can 
execute cyberattacks against the United States. Iran is capable, at a minimum, of carrying 
out attacks with temporary disruptive effects against critical infrastructure in the United 
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States.”197 Iran’s cyber threat was significant enough to ensure cell phones did not make 
it to the battlefield or any of the associated support bases for American troops. 
Within the military, it is common to have a set of regulations to prevent troops from 
conducting certain activities while on deployment. The restrictions often focus on alcohol 
consumption, sexual activities, illicit substances, personal firearms, and often fall under 
General Order Number 1, Prohibited Activities for members of the Department of 
Defense.198 In the future, it may be necessary to include cell phones and other electronic 
devices under this General Order. Failure to obey these restrictions results in a violation of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice and can result in a significant punishment for the 
service member, such as a loss of rank, pay, and possible discharge from the military. The 
establishment of such a severe punishment may assist in persuading troops not to bring 
cellular and smartphones on deployments. 
If this strict prohibition on phone use is enacted, the military must create an 
opportunity for troops to utilize the internet and other communications devices. The lessons 
from early in the Global War on Terror could be of value in this situation. Before the 
widespread use of cellular and smartphones, troops went to computer labs and call centers 
while deployed to a combat zone. These facilities were created as a joint venture between 
the Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) division of United States Army Europe 
(USAREUR) and the Space and Naval Systems Command (SPAWAR) Systems Center 
Atlantic-European Office (SPAWAR Europe).199 Together, they built a satellite “network 
capable of supporting high volumes of voice, video and data traffic to help foster positive 
morale and troop welfare by connecting soldiers with their loved ones.”200 While not 
available at every base in the combat area and limited on bandwidth, it was something the 
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service member could use to send emails, make phone calls, and pay bills. To ensure 
security, these facilities and their networks need to be hardened and protected from enemy 
cyber-attacks. Furthermore, troops will need to be trained in how to protect themselves in 
cyberspace. The computers being utilized will also need to be updated regularly and have 
proper virus protection software. The establishment of these facilities is essential for troops 
to remain in contact with those back home and to give them another means to communicate 
when their phones have been banned.  
B. EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF U.S. FORCES 
As evidenced by the amount of YouTube firefight and military prank videos, 
younger troops are more inclined to bring devices into the field. As a result, the military 
needs to better train its individual troops and units on the dangers of phones and mobile 
devices. Currently, the Department of Defense uses the Information Assurance (IA) 
training to explain the danger of phones and other mobile devices to individuals, including 
service members, civilians and contractors. The training is conducted annually, through a 
program called the Cyber Awareness Challenge 2020.201 This program introduces the 
trainee to Marty, a person ten years in the future, who warns them of an apocalyptic world 
caused by cybersecurity incidents.202 Marty then instructs the trainee that they can change 
the future by becoming more aware of the cyber threats and best practices that exist to 
counter them. The training focuses on the areas of Spillage, Sensitive Information, and 
Malicious Code. As the trainee completes each module of the training, the cyber threat is 
diminished, indicating the future is becoming more secure. The training seems to focus on 
the use of computers in an office environment, while little information is provided on the 
threats to mobile devices. The Cyber Security Challenge did include the Strava fitness app 
case study for GPS tracking; however, it was several screens the trainee could easily click 
through and ignore. In addition, no tactical or combat situations were included in the 
training to enlighten trainees to threats that could affect them on the battlefield.  
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New IA training needs to educate individual troops on the perils of posting to social 
media and the effects of OSINT through those mediums. The training also needs to give 
examples of the exploitation methods used by possible combatants on cellular and 
smartphones. Vignettes could be great teaching tools for younger service members and 
their leadership. If troops understand the hazards their phones create for their squad, 
platoon, or unit, they might be less inclined to utilize them on patrol. 
Unit field training needs to replicate the vulnerability of phone use and include 
direct consequences for their usage in these scenarios. Within the Army, there needs to be 
more emphasis on the effects of IW within the Combat Training Centers. These are the 
primary training events for Army Brigade Combat Teams that deploy to train against the 
OPFOR at Fort Irwin, California; Fort Polk, Louisiana; or Hohenfels, Germany. These 
training centers do an excellent job of stressing units and testing them in combined arms 
maneuver warfare, but they do little to introduce the threats and complexity demonstrated 
by Russian NGW and other asymmetric threats to the United States. Army Colonel Liam 
Collins states, “These scenarios tend to ignore or undervalue the role of information 
operations. To be sure, it is difficult to simulate many information operations effects in 
training or simulation, but that should not be the justification for ignoring them.”203 These 
facilities have a limited ability to jam tactical radio traffic, but that is the extent the IW 
effects used by the OPFOR. The Combat Training Centers need to do a better job of 
replicating the current threat for their trainees.  
Currently, the training team and OPFOR at the Joint Readiness Training Center in 
Fort Polk, Louisiana, take cellular and smartphone use seriously. Fort Polk bans the use of 
personal phones by everyone in a visiting unit except for some essential leaders who need 
to have contact with elements back at their home location.204 Those caught using their 
phones while in the training area are targeted with simulated artillery strikes. This policy 
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replicates the many triangulation systems that exist to locate cellular phones and then target 
their users with lethal effects. 
The United States Marine Corps also takes the dangers of cellular and smartphones 
seriously. This potential real-life scenario was recently depicted at a training exercise in 
California’s Mojave Desert at Twentynine Palms.205 A young Marine lance corporal took 
a selfie with his smartphone. The photo that he posted to social media was geotagged, 
which made known his unit type and location to the OPFOR. The Observer/Controller, or 
umpire, of the training event then “destroyed” the entire unit since proper targeting data 
could be rendered from the lance corporal’s post. Lieutenant General Lori Reynolds, the 
Marine Corps’ Deputy Commandant for Information, stated, “I’m sure that lance corporal 
was not happy. But it’s OK to learn those things in Twentynine Palms—we don’t want to 
learn those elsewhere.”206 This event surely gave the lance corporal’s unit a “black eye” 
and caused everyone from the lowest Marine to the unit’s Commander to learn a lesson. 
To be effective, these lessons from training need to have widespread and far-reaching 
effects to ensure troops and senior commanders understand the dangers of cellular and 
smartphones on the battlefield. 
While the removal of units from the training scenario to mimic being destroyed in 
battle can be an effective teaching tool, more can be done to truly replicate the full spectrum 
of dangers from cellular and mobile phones. The hacking of actual wireless networks used 
by the civilian populace would be illegal and problematic; therefore, a new training 
network could be created and visiting units could be forced to communicate through it. The 
closed network could then be manipulated, disrupted, and even shut down. This would give 
the unit getting trained a better appreciation for the threats they may face without any 
interference to actual military networks or private systems. To fully replicate the effects of 
adversarial interference to mobile communications, the government phone of every key 
leader would be replaced with a “training phone.” Each training center would maintain a 
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“training phone” for the critical brigade leaders that are reissued to each visiting unit. These 
phones would have generic contact data already uploaded to ease the burden of use. 
Furthermore, the “training phones” would operate on the enclosed network unique to the 
training center. This would allow the “training phones” to receive the same manipulations 
a phone in combat may experience. The use of dedicated “training phones” and networks 
would give leaders the experience of being hacked, spied on, and manipulated via their 
phone. Using OSINT investigating techniques, the OPFOR could even send threatening 
text messages to key leadership. The experience gained by unit leaders would go a long 
way in ensuring lower-level troops are better trained and have a better understanding of the 
dangers cellular and smartphones bring to the battlefield. Senior leaders could ensure that 
those in their chain of command are educated about enemy threats and the vulnerability of 
electronic devices. Instead of merely telling a service member not to bring their phone, the 
young soldier would now understand the “why” behind that decision. It will take significant 
funding and resources to make these training events work; however, their effects will go a 
long way in preparing U.S. troops and their leaders for the threats ahead. 
C. TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR U.S. ALLIES AND PARTNER 
FORCES 
The training of U.S. Allies and Partner Forces is essential to creating an effective 
deterrent to future conflict and preparing capable forces who are ready to fight in the event 
deterrence fails. U.S. Army Special Forces and the newly created Security Forces 
Assistance Brigades (SFAB) represent the two units the United States Army uses for 
conducting training with other nation’s militaries. These units are specially trained and 
equipped to train others to fight. The main missions for Special Forces are foreign internal 
defense and unconventional warfare.207 In these roles, Special Forces train friendly nation 
militaries and indigenous populations to conduct guerrilla warfare, respectively. However, 
as the current War on Terror has shown, the requirement to build up the army of 
Afghanistan and Iraq requires a significant amount of resources and trained professionals. 
General Miley, the former Chief of Staff of the Army, stated, “[Special Forces] can’t really 
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train the scope and level of training of an entire national army. It fell to the regular Army 
to do it.”208 Furthermore, Special Forces did not have the ability to train these host nation’s 
armies in job skills other than light infantry tactics. This left capability gaps in armor, 
artillery, logistics, and other vital skills for an army. The requirement to train entire armies 
meant the United States needed to create new units. 
The creation of the Security Force Assistance Command is a direct result of this 
requirement to train national armies. The current Security Force Assistance Command 
oversees five active-duty Security Force Assistance Brigades and one National Guard 
Brigade to train partner forces and their national armies.209 The purpose of these units is 
“to conduct training, advising, assisting, enabling, and accompanying operations with 
allied and partner nations.”210 Furthermore, these unique units are made up of soldiers who 
“are highly trained, and among the top tactical leaders in the Army. Their work will 
strengthen our allies and partners while supporting this Nation’s security objectives and 
the combatant commanders’ warfighting needs.”211 These Brigades exist solely to train 
and assist other nations in conducting and preparing for combat operations. There is one 
dangerous pitfall in the organizational structure of these units: no information security or 
IW capability. As IW has proven to be an effective component of modern battle, to stay 
effective in current and future fights, the United States needs to expand IW and IA training 
to its allies and partner forces.  
An information component needs to be added to the SFAB in order to improve its 
effectiveness as trainers, but the current number of IW personnel in these units is not 
sufficient for training this function. SFABs currently recruit from a large array of military 
occupational specialties from within the Army, but they do not include many soldiers who 
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specialize in an information related capability. The Army manual on Security Force 
Assistance Brigades states, “The SFAB has a sparse information capability that does not 
include specialists outside of communications technicians.”212 Members of the SFAB 
headquarters include Psychological Operations, Civil Affairs, and Electronic Warfare 
experts. However, these personnel are all senior Non-Commissioned Officers or mid-
career Commissioned Officers whose job is to assist with planning. This small number of 
personnel is not sufficient to create effective training for a host nation army. Furthermore, 
the individual advisor teams have no IW experts in their formation which is ineffective 
because they are the ones who actually interact with the trainees. To be more effective, 
these organizations need to create a more diverse IW component made up of Psychological 
Operations, Information Operations, Cyber, and more Electric Warfare professionals. The 
IW component could be a part of the Brigade Headquarters Company so they can train the 
individual advisor teams and be used as trainers for special situations. With an effective 
IW component, the SFAB will be considerably more capable of preparing host-nation 
armies to face credible future threats. 
The United States does not need to stand alone in the effort to train forces on the 
dangers of cellular and smartphones. This training and education model could be expanded 
to include NATO forces as well. It might be best if European Command, in conjunction 
with NATO, were to create an Information Warfare Taskforce. Basing the Taskforce in 
Estonia would be logical since it is home to the Tallinn Cyber Center of Excellence.213 
This center was developed after cyber-attacks Estonia experienced at the hands of Russia 
in 2007. Tallinn has become the focal point of cyber defense and warfare understanding 
within NATO. Thus, they have a more credible presence when working with NATO allies 
and other European countries. With this experience and these resources, a Taskforce from 
the Cyber Center of Excellence could be instrumental in training eastern European 
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countries and fostering a more secure mindset in regard to IW, cybersecurity, IA, and the 
use of cellular and smartphones.  
This change in mindset regarding cybersecurity and smartphone use is not only 
necessary in Europe, but around the globe. As China moves to push its 5G technology on 
the world, the threat of data exploitation is has become far greater. This poses a significant 
strategic threat to the United States and its allies. However, this technology also poses a 
substantial tactical threat. As has been illustrated earlier in this thesis and throughout 
history, when an adversary can read an opponent’s secret messages, the opponent loses a 
significant advantage. With this threat in mind, our partners and allies in the Pacific need 
to ensure they practice effective IA, OPSEC, and are aware of the threats from cellular and 
smartphones. The United States has traditionally conducted annual training exercises in 
South Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. These training events should also include IW 
scenarios. American combat elements that deploy to these areas and their associated 
command structures need to gain more repetitions in training against these threats. 
Furthermore, American allies in Asia, particularly because of the Chinese threat, also need 
to be prepared for these same risks. 
D. CONCLUSION 
It is going to be very difficult to remove mobile phones from each soldier. When 
research teams in Ukraine interviewed troops on why they continued to use their phones 
despite their vulnerabilities, they stated: “We need to live.”214 They need to stay connected 
to their families, pay their bills, and have fun on their off time. With effective prescriptive 
measures, troops can gain a better understanding of how the devices they “need to live” 
can actually help them die in combat. If each service member understands the dangers of 
his devices and if he has effective leadership to keep these devices controlled, then the 
threat can become significantly reduced. 
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The prescriptive measures discussed in this chapter could be very effective in 
mitigating the vulnerabilities introduced by the use of cellular and smartphones to the 
battlefield. Improved training and education for troops at the individual level will make 
them more aware of the dangers that come from mobile devices. The collective unit training 
they experience at the Combat Training Centers with dedicated training networks and 
phones can take lessons learned in a classroom and transform them into tangible 
experiences to cement those lessons. Finally, by improving the units that train American 
allies and partner forces with the addition of information detachments, the United States 
can ensure its friends and compatriots around the world are better able to fight and win on 
the battlefield of the future in which the exploitation of technology will take on a key role.  
This thesis serves to give an understanding of how cellular and smartphones 
introduce vulnerabilities to the battlefield that make it easier for the enemy to exploit the 
American warfighter. This began with a look at the operation of cellular phones, networks, 
and IMSI catchers to allow the reader to understand how these devices work. With this 
technical understanding, the reader was introduced to the three vulnerabilities created by 
cellular and smartphones: propaganda proliferation, targets of cyberspace exploitation, and 
OPSEC concerns. These vulnerabilities were discussed through the case study of the 2014 
Russian invasion and subsequent occupation of eastern Ukraine. The case study allowed 
the reader to experience the effects of these vulnerabilities in a real-world scenario. Each 
of the vulnerabilities was then examined through a recent incident that had direct effects 
on the United States military to emphasize the threat of these devices. Next, the thesis 
examined the future of these three vulnerabilities on the United States military. The 
development of 5G technology, deepfake videos, and vulnerabilities in the IoT all offer 
new vectors to attack and exploit American service members. Finally, the thesis concludes 
with a look at some prescriptive measures to mitigate the damage from cellular and 
smartphones. While banning phones is the easiest to implement, more effective training 
and education is needed to ensure service members know the reason why their phones 
cannot be used. This model then needs to be applied to the allies and partner forces of the 
United States. Ensuring the warfighter knows why his/her phone is a hazard is the key to 
preventing it from causing harm in battle.  
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The weaponization of technology will continue to increase as technology advances 
and as hackers have more time to exploit its vulnerabilities. The battlefield will become a 
more chaotic place as violence and technology merge to make combat faster and more 
deadly. The Ukrainian case study shows many of the battlefield vulnerabilities opened by 
the widespread use of cellular phones. No longer do commanders need merely to concern 
themselves with embarrassing photos and messages written by soldiers on social media. 
The war in Ukraine is only a glimpse of what is in store for the global community in the 
remainder of the twenty-first century. Commanders need to realize that the devices that 
have brought the internet to everyone’s fingertips can also bring the enemy. Innocent 
applications that allow family members to track everyone’s location can be manipulated to 
deliver lethal artillery rounds. The photo sent from a soldier’s wife to her husband can now 
be sent to a false cell tower, uploaded with malware and sent to a victim to attack their 
phone or target their location. The United States needs to be prepared to defeat its foes and 
extend a helping hand to allies, both on the physical battlefield and in the information 
environment. 
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